Chapter 5

Is Privacy a Woman?*

Of a green evening, clear and warm,
She bathed in her still garden, while
The red-eyed elders, watching, felt
The basses of their beings throb
In witching chords, and their thin blood
Pulse pizzicati of Hosanna.

In the green water, clear and warm,
Susanna lay.
She searched
The touch of springs,
And found
Concealed imaginings.

--from Wallace Stevens, Peter Quince at the Clavier

Sex and Gadgets

In the penultimate scene of the James Bond movie, The World is Not Enough (1999), M (played by Judi Dench) and her team deploy a thermal-imaging satellite device to try to find Bond, who is with Dr. Christmas Jones, a nuclear physicist with whom he

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has just completed a mission. As they home in on Bond’s location, the screen displays a thermal image of his body lying on a bed. Then they discern an additional pair of legs in the bed. The image gets redder, signifying increasing heat. The accidental voyeurs come to realize that the thermal image is revealing Bond and Dr. Jones . . . in a compromising position! At M’s prudish exclamation, Q (played by John Cleese) abruptly shuts off the image, sheepishly blaming a “premature form of the millennium bug.”

At the turn of the millennium, forty years after Justice Stewart offhandedly mocked a futuristic fantasy of “frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society,” the Supreme Court in *Kyllo v. United States* considered the government’s use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the amount of heat emanating from a home. The Court held that this use constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus was subject to the Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches. Suspecting that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home using heat lamps, the police, parked on a public street, scanned his house using a thermal imager that “operate[d] somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.” Based in part on the image of hot spots on the roof and wall, the police got a warrant to search his house and found a marijuana-growing operation.

Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia thought the broad question was “what limits there are upon th[e] power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.” The realm of privacy here was “the prototypical” interior of the home. Freedom from unreasonable government intrusion into the home, of course, lay at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of privacy, and it was well established that a warrantless search of a home was presumptively unreasonable in violation of that amendment. But the
issue here was whether the government’s use of a thermal imager to detect heat being emitted from the home was a “search” at all. The Court had previously held that naked-eye visual surveillance of a home in plain public view was not a search. 9 But what about observations of a home aided by “sense-enhancing technology”? 10

Faced with that thought, the Court feared to “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.” 11 It anticipated a world in which the police might enjoy the functional equivalent of x-ray vision in conducting surveillance without a warrant, which would render the home totally transparent. The most basic means of hiding private activity—the physical walls of a home—might be undone. 12 The Court thus held that where “the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” 13

Lady in Heat

But wait a minute. In Kyllo, the only detail the device was capable of detecting was the amount of heat emanating from the house. Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens dismissed “the notion that heat emissions from the outside of a dwelling are a private matter implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” 14 But according to Justice Scalia, “the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home” meant that “in the home, . . . all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes,” including “how warm . . . Kyllo was heating his residence.” 15 Home privacy thus did not depend on whether the particular details observed were specifically to be
considered intimate. Even “the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule floor” performed a search of a home that was unconstitutional without a warrant.\textsuperscript{16}

In any event, Justice Scalia speculated, the heat-sensing device might well disclose intimate information—such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”\textsuperscript{17} This figure of the imagination was apparently intended to evoke private acts that people care to hide from public view. This particular detail was striking in its anachronism. Most people today shower rather than bathe, and even fewer take a daily sauna. Moreover, Justice Scalia does not imagine merely any detail of the home, but a woman, specifically a “lady.” And speaking of “the lady of the house” implies her counterpart, the master of the house.\textsuperscript{18} This anachronistic language thus calls to mind more than the privacy interest of a person bathing. It also evokes the privacy interest of the man entitled to see the lady of the house naked, and his interest in shielding her body from prying eyes. Privacy is figured as a woman, object of the male gaze.

The lady in the bath pits old against new, anachronism against futuristic technology. She is a figure for values of old-fashioned privacy under threat.\textsuperscript{19} Privacy is a woman—not just a woman, but a lady—imagined as domesticity in a well-ordered traditional marital home.\textsuperscript{20} Justice Scalia invites us to “see” a thermal image of this lady. We become invited voyeurs. Her sybaritic form is revealed precisely to show the need to keep her hidden from view.

In the Bond film with which I began, the meaning of the heat image—sex—is revealed as increasing heat is sensed by the thermal imager. What is the meaning of
Kyllo’s detection of old-fashioned heat-generation? Justice Scalia invites us to gaze at the forbidden. He does not state crudely that frightening paraphernalia might one day reveal people at home engaged in a sex act. But the suggestive revelation of the lady in the bath is innuendo (metonymy) of privacy contiguous to the bath. We hear the ironic echoes of Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, on allowing “the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of” . . . well, marital sex. And of course the “very idea” is “repulsive to notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” We are conscripted as witnesses of repulsive conduct.

Kyllo’s soft-core innuendo also hints at Stanley v. Georgia’s home privacy right to look at images of sex and naked women, free from government intrusion. Recall that in Stanley, police searching for bookmaking evidence looked “in a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom” and “found three reels of eight-millimeter film. Using a projector and screen found in an upstairs living room, they viewed the films,” whereupon the police “concluded that they were obscene.” Then “a further examination of the bedroom indicated that appellant occupied it.” All that trouble to reach the shocking conclusion that what is going on in the home is sexual arousal (raising the specter of masturbation) aided by sense-enhancing depictions of women.

The forbidden gaze on a beautiful woman bathing is a familiar Western trope. The prophet Teiresias comes upon Athena bathing in a fountain and is struck blind by the sight. Ovid tells the story of Actaeon coming across Diana in her bathing pool and being turned into a deer and killed by his own hounds. In the Bible, King David spies on Bathsheba, another man’s wife, bathing on her roof. He sends for, has sex with, and
impregnates her, then has her husband killed and marries her, whereupon God punishes him by killing their son and imposing a curse on the House of David.

The bathing woman who has perhaps inspired the most visual representation in Western art is drawn from the biblical story of Susanna and the Elders. While two judges are at a rich man’s house where they meet for legal proceedings, they secretly observe his beautiful wife bathing in the walled garden. They threaten that if she does not have sex with them they will publicly accuse her of adultery. Having refused them, she is arrested, tried, and convicted, but ultimately the accusation is proven false. The accusers are put to death by the law and her virtuous reputation is restored. This is a legal story of punishment for incursion on the marital home in the form of the visual observation of the forbidden – the bathing woman. Her image is projected into our mind’s eye by innumerable works of art since the Renaissance, among them paintings by Titian, Tintoretto, Veronese, Annibale Caracci, Artemisia Gentileschi, Rubens, Van Dyke, Guido Reni, and Rembrandt, whose depictions of Susanna range from chaste nude to erotic temptress.

Kyllo’s lady in the bath draws on cultural associations that emanate from this canonical story: The prying eyes of legal elders who violate the private boundary of a home and lust after a man’s wife. The predication of well-ordered domesticity on the woman’s virtue, gravely threatened by the suggestion of sexual infidelity, even rape, enacted in the voyeurs’ observation of her naked body. The restoration of domestic order qua legal order by punishment of the gaze.

Men secretly watching women prepare for nighttime sleep is a related theme. The myth of Gyges, told by Herodotus, is another exemplar of the surreptitious male gaze
in the Western canon. Rather than forbidding the gaze, however, King Candaules wishes to show his beautiful queen to Gyges, his royal guard and confidant, and arranges for him to hide in her bedroom to see her naked. But the queen sees Gyges, becomes enraged, and puts to him the choice of killing the king or being killed himself. Gyges slays the king, takes the crown, and marries the queen.

The adage, a man’s home is his castle represents an idea with which “we have . . . lived our whole national history.” The adage has been invoked in dozens of Supreme Court cases on privacy, and “has become part of our constitutional tradition.” The rhetorical power of the home as castle lies in its comparison of the ordinary man to the king. If in the adage the home is envisioned as a barrier against intrusion, we have seen that anxiety about intrusion can be expressed as anxiety about female sexual virtue. A meaning of a man’s home as his castle that emerges here is the need to shield a wife’s body from other men’s desire.

In Kyllo, the technology that would make the home accessible to prying eyes thus comes up against the technology of the castle. Recapitulating the age-old paradox attending the visual representation of voyeurism, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo reveals the lady in the bath to illustrate the imperative to hide her. The result in turn reveals the idea of the home from which the home privacy in mind is derived.

Penetrating the Home

But perhaps we are getting carried away. After all, the device in Kyllo detected merely heat on the external walls of the house, not people inside. Justice Stevens, so down to earth here, thus reminds us: “In fact, the device could not, and did not, enable its
user to identify either the lady of the house, the rug on the vestibule floor, or anything else inside the house . . . .”\textsuperscript{36} It was not actually x-ray—or x-rated—vision. Justice Stevens found it significant that the device could not perform “through-the-wall” surveillance.\textsuperscript{37} That is, the device only detected heat from the exterior surfaces of the home; the police would have to infer details about the interior of the home from information that was already exposed to the public. Justice Stevens wrote: “It would be quite absurd to characterize their thought processes as ‘searches,’ regardless of whether they inferred (rightly) that petitioner was growing marijuana in his house, or (wrongly) that ‘the lady of the house [was taking] her daily sauna and bath.’”\textsuperscript{38} An inference, Justice Stevens thought, could not amount to a Fourth Amendment search.\textsuperscript{39}

This distinction between a “search” and an “inference” tracks the difference between inside and outside. If technology were to give the police “the ability to ‘see’ through walls and other opaque barriers,”\textsuperscript{40} what would that mean? Here po-mo Justice Scalia performed an impressive take-down of the distinction between searching and inferring, between inside and outside. Short of “an 8-by-10 Kodak glossy that needs no analysis (i.e., the making of inferences),” he said, even “through-the-wall radar or ultrasound technology” requires inference to make conclusions about activities inside a home.\textsuperscript{41} The information must be interpreted. It is interpretive inference then that effectively penetrates the wall.

Ultimately, the Court’s test of whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred was whether the device revealed “details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”\textsuperscript{42} Justice Stevens objected that the heat-sensor “did not accomplish ‘an unauthorized physical penetration.’”\textsuperscript{43} The crux of the
disagreement was thus whether interpretation that produces knowledge about the inside of a home was tantamount to penetration.

The lady in the bath, a figure for privacy at the mercy of advancing technology, embodies anxiety about penetration. As if to perform her danger, Justice Scalia invites us to view her in her private nighttime ritual. The use of voyeurism as a device in *Kyllo* associates penetration of women with penetration of castle walls. As the image of the lady in the bath becomes visible, the specter of “unauthorized physical penetration”—rape—arises. Voyeuristically “seeing” the lady in the bath through opaque barriers—through inference—thus suggests the physical penetration of the home that is the prototypical Fourth Amendment violation. Juxtaposed to the figure of privacy as a lady whose body might be violated by being seen, the language of penetration underscores the Court’s conviction that obtaining knowledge of the inside of a home through inference aided by technology is indeed a search. When the home becomes penetrable like the woman’s body, the castle is breached.

The Disordered Home

If *Kyllo’s* lady in the bath evokes both the sanctity of the home and the anxiety about intrusion by the government, the notion of privacy is wrapped up in the idea of shielding the woman in the home. But this presupposes the orderliness of the marital home with husband and wife playing proper roles. But what about when the home is not so orderly?

In the 2006 case of *Georgia v. Randolph*, the idea of protecting a woman played a more explicit and elaborate role in the Supreme Court’s consideration of Fourth
Amendment privacy. This time the woman figured was not the lady of an old-fashioned, well-ordered domesticity, but rather, a wife in a home disordered by spousal discord. The question in *Randolph* was the reasonableness of a warrantless entry and search of a home when an occupant gives the police consent and another occupant expressly refuses entry. The Court held that such a search as to the unconsenting occupant was unreasonable.

Warrantless entry of a home is presumptively unreasonable, of course, except when the police have the voluntary consent of a person possessing authority, or exigent circumstances exist. The question thus appeared simple. When two people who live in the same home disagree on whether the police may enter and search, which one should prevail – the consenting occupant or the objecting occupant? A previous decision by the Court had held that the police may enter with an occupant’s consent in the other occupant’s absence. But in *Randolph*, the physical presence of the objecting occupant was a distinction that made a difference.

*Randolph* produced six separate opinions by the Justices that revealed the fault-lines in the modern meaning of home privacy. The case featured conflict between feuding spouses whose intentions with respect to the continuation of their marriage were unclear. All was not well in Scott and Janet Randolph’s home. Janet had called the police about a domestic dispute in which her husband took their son to a neighbor’s house. When the police arrived, she told them of marital troubles, a spousal separation, her foray with her son to Canada, and her recent return to the marital home. Scott told of taking their son to a neighbor to prevent his wife from taking him out of the country again. Janet then revealed that her husband used drugs. Over Scott’s objection, Janet
led the police to his bedroom, where they found a straw with cocaine residue. On that basis, the police got a search warrant and found further drug evidence with which to indict him for cocaine possession. The marital disunity and disorderliness in their home seemed borne out in the couple’s division over consent to search their home and willingness to expose their conflict to the police.

Calling

We know a man imperfectly until we know his society, and we but half know a society until we know its manners.

--Henry James

At oral argument in *Randolph*, Justice O’Connor began by asking counsel for Georgia whether letting in a stranger “against the express wishes of your spouse or co-habitant” was “socially acceptable.” Counsel answered that he thought it was “common,” to which O’Connor retorted, “Well, it might be common, but I’m not sure that’s an acceptable kind of performance.” O’Connor’s immediate distinction between the socially common—with its double valence of widespread and lower class—and the socially acceptable proved important indeed.

Justice Souter writing for the Court emphasized “the great significance given to widely shared social expectations” in the determination of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Applying this notion of social expectations to the situation where people who share a house disagree, Justice Souter asserted that “a caller standing at the
door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying ‘stay out.’ Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions."

The language of “shared premises” and “fellow tenant,” which imply roommate living, take us away from the facts here, which involved a husband-wife relationship and a marital home. But the reference to a visitor to a house as a “caller” bears special remark. When juxtaposed with the concept of “social expectations,” the anachronistic term “caller” tends to evoke the social context in which that term was regularly used. Known to be partial to the manners of previous generations, Justice Souter brings to mind the social world of the Gilded Age when the norms of calling upon others in their homes were codified in shared rules of etiquette. In this world, social manners and conduct in society were conceived and practiced as a system of rules akin to a legal code.

A person would pay a call by arriving at the home of a lady, during an hour designated as a time when she was “at home,” which was to say, prepared to receive callers. It was the prerogative of the lady of the house to choose whether or not to receive a particular caller. The caller would present a calling card engraved with his name. The entire process was steeped in formality, and implied the existence of a servant to field the enquiry at the door and to bear the message of arrival. The acceptability of the caller might be secured by the “style of a gentleman’s card, the hour of his visit, and his address,” in addition to the person arranging the introduction. The caller was told that the lady was “at home,” and unacceptable callers were told that she was “not at home.”
The formal system of calling and receiving callers was a privilege of the high bourgeoisie. A late nineteenth-century book on etiquette, which purports to “furnish a report or a description of our customs as taught and practiced by the superior families of New York city,” characterizes the system of calling as “a wall of defense against strange and unwelcome visitors. However unpleasant the result may be of an attempt to make a lady’s acquaintance, every true gentleman will recognize the necessity of barriers across the sacred threshold of the home.” The system of calling was a code within “a common formula of courtesies, which is known as our own social etiquette, which should be the thoroughly understood method of communicating our regard for each other.”

Etiquette “is like a wall built up around us to protect us from disagreeable, under-bred people, who refuse to take the trouble to be civil.” This etiquette thus “serves as a guard and preserver of our household sanctities.” Drawing on the trope of home as barrier against intrusion, the social code governing the practice of calling could itself be imagined as the maintenance of walls to “shield against the intrusion of the impertinent, improper, and the vulgar,” in the literal form of rules regulating entry into the home.

To invoke this vanished world was to introduce by suggestion a rhetorical figure as distinctive as Kyllo’s lady in her bath. That figure too was a lady, in the nineteenth-century sense that associated being a lady with high-bourgeois status. But if Justice Scalia’s lady of the house was to be protected in her home from the penetrative male gaze, Justice Souter’s was the lady “at home,” determining whether to receive or decline visitors—especially those gentlemen whom the word “caller” even today conjures. Indeed, the lady at home is the woman determining social access to her home. This lady, too, is a figure of privacy as much as the lady in the bath, but brings to mind a different
type of home privacy, one that accentuates her class-inflected authority to exclude those deemed socially unacceptable.\textsuperscript{72}

The idea of regulating access to a home in conformity with well-understood social codes presupposes orderly knowledge of them. According to the author of the nineteenth-century etiquette text: “Intimate acquaintance with the refined customs and highest tones of society insures harmony in its conduct, while ignorance of them inevitably produces discords and confusion. Fortunate are those who were born in an atmosphere of intelligent refinement, because mistakes to them are impossible.”\textsuperscript{73} Social etiquette prevents the “agony of uncertainty.”\textsuperscript{74} Justice Souter’s confidence that “no sensible person would go inside” in the face of a “disputed invitation”\textsuperscript{75} assumed a shared social certainty. But this reference to social etiquette also drew attention to the comparative uncertainty of “social expectations” today, when conformity to a standard set of expectations cannot be assumed.\textsuperscript{76} In the context of the recalled social codes of a bygone world, Justice Souter’s anachronistic confidence only accentuated today’s relatively lesser clarity on what is or is not socially acceptable.

Recognizing Justice Souter’s invocation of the lost world of formal social codes, Chief Justice Roberts wasted no opportunity to dismiss the approach as hopelessly irrelevant to the case at hand. Whether or not it is obvious that a social guest simply would not enter when faced with the conflict over consent, the social convention to which Justice Souter alluded was not, according to Chief Justice Roberts, on point, because “Mrs. Randolph did not invite the police to join her for dessert and coffee.” Instead, “the officer’s precise purpose in knocking on the door was to assist with a dispute between the
Randolphs—one in which Mrs. Randolph felt the need for the protective presence of the police.”

With the mention of dessert and coffee, Roberts deflated the notion of social convention. The point was not simply that the decorous practice of invitations and callers is inapposite to a situation where a wife calls the cops on her husband and reveals his drug stash. It is rather that the model of social convention is the wrong one to use in ascertaining the meaning of constitutional privacy: “A wide variety of subtle social conventions may shape expectations about how we act when another shares with us what is otherwise private, and those conventions go by a variety of labels – courtesy, good manners, custom, protocol, even honor among thieves. The Constitution, however, protects not these but privacy.” With this Roberts opened up a competing account of privacy, in a strikingly different sociological frame.

Battering

Concepts of privacy permit, encourage, and reinforce violence against women.

--Elizabeth Schneider

For Chief Justice Roberts, a man of a later generation, it turns out that the connotations of privacy, home, and women are different from the figure of the high bourgeois woman. In place of the lady of the house, Roberts introduces another kind of woman who has become familiar to us: the battered woman, trapped in her home, oppressed by her husband under the guise of an outmoded privacy that enables him to
dominate her while the state does not intervene. This figure is in its way as familiar and evocative as the lady in the bath. She is the battered woman whose situation is a primary focus of legal feminism, which understands abuse as an exemplar of the patriarchal ideology of marriage. Her plight is, according to received wisdom, a product of a common law that gave the husband legal authority over his wife, purporting to protect her while immuring her in the prison of marital privacy.

In his dissenting opinion, Roberts played out this alternative figuring through an account of how the majority’s rule shields domestic abusers and fails to protect battered women: “Perhaps the most serious consequence of the majority’s rule is its operation in domestic abuse situation, a context in which the present question often arises. . . . The majority’s rule apparently forbids police from entering to assist with a domestic dispute if the abuser whose behavior prompted the request for police assistance objects.”

Two factors pique our interest in Roberts’s battered women discourse. First, on the facts, Mrs. Randolph was not alleged to have been beaten, any more than she was alleged to have invited the police over for dessert and coffee. With respect to these facts, Roberts’s move was at least as figurative as Souter’s, if decidedly more au courant. Second, as Souter pointed out in replying to Roberts, the majority explicitly did not hold that the police could not enter in such circumstances. In Randolph, there were no such circumstances.

In other words, Roberts’s invocation of battered women to support the view that police entry into the home was reasonable took a position in a familiar ongoing conversation regarding the enforcement of domestic violence laws. In that debate, “privacy” is sometimes described as a construct that operates to deny women the
protection of law in favor of their husbands’ privacy.\textsuperscript{86} Roberts assimilated that position into the meaning of Fourth Amendment privacy. He did this by emphasizing the consequences of the Court’s rule for police protection of battered women and enforcement of domestic violence law. Privacy then was figured, not as a lady, but as a battered woman.

Justice Souter, though, insisted that domestic violence was a “red herring.”\textsuperscript{87} This was because police had an “undoubted right” to enter a dwelling to protect a domestic violence victim even where the abuser refused the police entry.\textsuperscript{88} Recognizing that “domestic abuse is a serious problem in the United States,” and citing a long string of statistics on violence against women in the home,\textsuperscript{89} Justice Souter was confident that under the Court’s rule, “there is no danger that the fearful occupant will be kept behind the closed door of the house simply because the abusive tenant refuses to consent to a search.”\textsuperscript{90}

Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, took even greater pains to explain that the result in this case does not hamper enforcement of domestic violence, because domestic abuse is a special circumstance that would make police entry reasonable under a totality of the circumstances inquiry.\textsuperscript{91} He explained: “If a possible abuse victim invites a responding officer to enter a home or consents to the officer’s entry request, that invitation (or consent) itself could reflect the victim’s fear about being left alone with an abuser. It could also indicate the availability of evidence, in the form of an immediate willingness to speak, that might not otherwise exist. In that context, an invitation (or consent) would provide a special reason for immediate, rather than later, police entry. And, entry following invitation or consent by one party ordinarily would be reasonable
even in the face of direct objection by the other.” Justice Breyer, who joined the Court’s holding and opinion only “with these understandings,” appeared to have wrung his hands quite a bit about the implications of the Court’s ruling. If domestic violence shaped Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, it managed to rattle Justice Breyer so much that he wrote separately to explain how the Court’s holding was in fact perfectly compatible with strong domestic violence enforcement. Forced to consider the conflict between the protection of home privacy and the protection of battered women, Justice Breyer insisted there was no conflict, and that battered women were well protected by the Court’s rule.

Dividing the Home

What is the relation between the two figures, the anachronistic lady of the house and the contemporary battered woman? Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion tells a story of the relation grounded in the historical demise of coverture and the rise of gender equality: “In the 18th century, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, . . . [g]iven then-prevailing dramatic differences between the property rights of the husband and the far lesser rights of the wife, only the consent of the husband would matter. Whether ’the master of the house’ consented or objected, his decision would control.” Under the law of coverture, the lady of the house was a wife whose rights were “covered” by that of her husband. Today, however, “it is now clear, as a matter of constitutional law, that the male and the female are equal partners.” The consequence of this equality and the individuation of spouses’ legal identities is that neither spouse can decide for the other one to waive a constitutional right. Today, “neither [spouse] is a master possessing the
power to override the other’s constitutional right to deny entry to their castle.” Thus a spouse’s consent to give up privacy in the home can be effective only as to himself or herself.

Stevens thereby presented modern sex equality as determining the content of modern privacy: for spouses to be equal as a matter of constitutional law, each must be able to preserve privacy in the home through the right to exclude outsiders. The lady of the house evokes the norms of coverture in which the right contemplated in the adage, “a man’s home is his castle,” is the right of the master of the house. A consequence of the division of the legal identities of husband and wife, then, is the division of the privacy of the home such that a spouse cannot consent to entry over the objections of the other spouse.

But Justice Scalia, in a separate dissenting opinion, was not to be outdone on gender equality. He was unwilling to concede that equality demands that each spouse be able to exclude the police from the marital home, since spouses would be just as equal if neither could exclude the police in the face of the other’s consent: “Justice Stevens’ panegyric to the equal rights of women under modern property law does not support his conclusion that . . . ‘neither [spouse] is a master possessing the power to override the other’s constitutional right to deny entry to their castle.’ . . . Men and women are no more ‘equal’ in the majority’s regime, where both sexes can veto each other’s consent, than on the dissent’s view, where both sexes cannot.” The core of Scalia’s disagreement with Stevens lay in a redirection of the meaning of marital equality in the home, to focus not on home privacy as the right to exclude outsiders, but on the equal right to override the other spouse’s privacy.
Justice Scalia shadowed the influential move within legal feminism that critiques home privacy as an enabler of sex inequality, specifically its role in male violence against women in the marital home: “Given the usual patterns of domestic violence, how often can police be expected to encounter the situation in which a man urges them to enter the home while a woman simultaneously demands that they stay out? The most common practical effect of today’s decision, insofar as the contest between the sexes is concerned, is to give men the power to stop women from allowing police into their homes.” We see the spectacle of Justice Scalia parroting a view worthy of Catharine MacKinnon that an equal right to exclude the police will have the inevitable effect in the world of enabling the men to keep out the police while they beat their wives into submission. The idea of the man’s home as his castle here is tarred with the same brush that has tarred privacy in feminist critiques of marriage.

Can we reconcile this picture with that of the home imagined in *Kyllo*, of the right of the master of the house to see his wife naked and protect her from prying government eyes? Perhaps. In both, Justice Scalia imagined privacy to be invoked by a man in the marital home with respect to government access to his wife, be she a naked lady or a battered woman. The master of the house and the state are the agents who fight to protect the woman in the home from the other.

If *Kyllo*’s object of privacy was a woman in a man’s castle, Justice Souter’s emphasis was rather on the respectable woman in her home who, pursuant to social convention, determines which callers are acceptable to her. Justice Stevens updated this emphasis by explaining that sex equality demands that the wife have the same authority as her husband to exclude persons from the home.
Roberts and Scalia, however, emphasized the figure of the battered woman and moved polite society out of the frame. According to the received wisdom of legal feminism, a battered woman’s domination by her husband and dire circumstances severely limit her autonomy to leave the home or the relationship. What the battered woman needs, therefore, is not home privacy but rather protection from the home.

The difference between respectability, positively associated with privacy, and domestic abuse, negatively associated with privacy, also marks a difference of social status. The high bourgeois woman nicely underscored the implicit association of the notion of “social expectations” with upper reaches of society. In attributing those norms, however unfittingly, to the wife of a cocaine user, Souter drew on the image of a high-born woman allowing some callers and excluding others from her home.

It was this ennobling move that attracted the ridicule of Chief Justice Roberts, who pointed out that Janet Randolph’s call to the police was not an invitation for dessert and coffee. Assimilating her instead to the figure of the battered woman—again, a move not indicated by the facts in this particular case—suggested at least by implication lower social status in which the idea of decorum seemed inapposite, even ridiculous. He imagines that the poor battered woman—poor in both senses—has little interest in privacy in the home; instead her overriding interest is in police protection. To be a battered woman is to be without social status, and thus she does not have, need, or enjoy the kind of privacy associated with the bourgeois home.

The odd man out in this configuration is Justice Breyer, who, the oral argument transcript reveals, repeatedly voiced his worries about domestic violence scenarios in which a woman tells the police to enter and her abuser objects. He was concerned that
the available signs would be too ambiguous to allow the police to enter the home. At oral argument Breyer told defendant’s counsel that his concern was “that if you win this case, in those ambiguous situations, where the wife wants the policeman in, and she’s afraid to tell him why, until she gets him up to the room—she wants him in—and he, now under your rule, . . . could not go in.”

Justice Breyer’s hackles may have been raised by another case that Term. In the same Term, the Court also considered *Hammon v. Indiana*, a case with facts actually involving domestic violence that required the Court to determine whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to statements made to the police at a crime scene. That case tested the constitutionality of the increasingly common phenomenon of victimless prosecution, in which statements to law enforcement officials by a domestic violence victim are introduced at trial but is absent at trial, because she refuses to cooperate with the prosecution.

*Hammon*’s facts largely resembled the scenario that Justice Breyer worried about in *Randolph*. The police responded to a report of domestic disturbance, and when they arrived at the home they were assured by both husband and wife that nothing was wrong, though the wife looked frightened and gave the police permission to enter. When the police questioned the wife in a different room from her husband, the wife said her husband shoved and hit her. The Court held that the wife’s statements to the police were subject to the Confrontation Clause because they were given in an interrogation the purpose of which was to investigate past criminal events, rather than to stop an emergency in progress.
Breyer worried about just that scenario—in which no emergency justifies police entry, and the wife is nervous and wants police presence, but the husband tells the police to stay out. Breyer resolved this worry by suggesting that in each individual instance, the police could determine whether the woman who gives consent to enter is a battered woman. If she is a battered woman, then her consent would permit a search over her husband’s objection. If she is not battered—as apparently was the case in *Randolph*—then her husband’s refusal keeps the police out.

For Breyer, domestic abuse was the crucial element of the home on which turned the reasonableness of the search. He was not prepared to join Roberts in the implication that every home should be treated as a site of domestic violence and the battered woman as the exemplary woman. But neither was he wholly satisfied with Souter’s aura of bourgeois respectability in the home so that the battered woman became the exceptional woman. Breyer rather saw the constitutional rule as turning upon whether the woman was battered. His opinion, therefore, reveals perfectly what is at issue between the different opinions in the case. Privacy in the face of split consent depends on whether one imagines the home and the woman in it as respectable and thus needing privacy, or alternatively, as disordered and thus needing police protection from privacy.

At oral argument, counsel for the United States, as amicus curiae, told the Justices: “Many of these cases arise not among couples who are harmonious, but among couples in which there is some degree of tension, and the spouse who consents in these situations has an independent interest in ensuring that she can call upon the protection of the law.” *Randolph* was in multiple senses about a house divided. In the factual
scenario, husband and wife expressly disagree about permitting entry. The decision records that the couple had marital troubles. Calling upon the police was yet another move in their ongoing domestic dispute. Janet actively led the police to her husband’s drugs, quite possibly in retaliation for her husband taking her child away. The case represents the couple’s division over consent to enter as a manifestation of the lack of marital harmony. Each spouse’s deployment of the police became a means of furthering the marital division.

This aspect of marital disunity corresponds to Chief Justice Roberts’s analogy to a person who shares secret information.\(^{113}\) According to Roberts, just as the sharer of the secret cannot object when the other person then turns around and shares it with the government, the home resident cannot object when the co-habitant allows the police into the shared private space.\(^{114}\) This is a vision in which privacy and private space are always legitimately subject to possible state presence, because one person could ally with the state against an intimate at any time.

Telling is Roberts’s reliance on *Trammel v. United States*, in which the Court held that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony can be waived by the testifying spouse.\(^{115}\) Like Roberts in *Randolph*, the Court in *Trammel* explained its desire to discard the old patriarchal rules of marriage: “Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have been cast aside so that ‘[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.’”\(^{116}\) And similarly, *Trammel*’s language implicitly contrasted the disordered home with the well-ordered one: “When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding . . . their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.” And once the disrepair of the home was made plain by a spouse’s willingness to turn against her spouse, protecting a subordinated wife from a husband’s coercion was the goal: “It hardly seems conducive to the preservation of the marital relation to place a wife in jeopardy solely by virtue of her husband’s control over her testimony.”

In the disordered home, privacy wholly depends on the other person choosing not to let the police in. At any time the government may have access to things one considers private because one may be betrayed by intimates. In Roberts’s vision, the possibility of one party compromising privacy is a corollary of the disordered marriage. Hence the disordered marriage is a paranoid state in which each spouse can always report on the other spouse to the police. That potential means that the state is present in the marriage and the marital home is already divided. Roberts’s focus on domestic violence—in which the spouses are configured as criminal and victim, with their respective relationships to the state—brings home that division, which is as profoundly statist as it claims to be feminist.

What Kind of Woman?

The feminist visions of the home that emerge in *Randolph* become visible as divisions within feminism. The formal egalitarian view that each spouse should have a right to exclude is mocked by Chief Justice Roberts’s subordination feminism, in which the home is ground zero of male domination, a space that the (male) state must enter to protect a woman from the master of the house.
In *Randolph*, the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment and its characteristic debates over privacy and consent are reconstructed through the manifestation of feminism divided. What appears on the surface to be a rather ordinary Fourth Amendment case, with the Court’s liberal members excluding the police, over the dissent of its conservative members who would permit them to enter, is in fact a stage for the performance of distinctive feminist debates on the legal idea of home.

Privacy—the concept at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is figured as a woman. The privacy debate operates on one level as a debate about what sort of woman we have in mind—respectable or battered, high status or low, in need of privacy or in need of protection. On another level, the privacy debate is about which feminist idea of the woman will shape constitutional doctrine. Should it be equality, with emphasis on equal rights to home privacy, or subordination, with emphasis on the home as a site of violence in which privacy would be an anachronistic shield for male domination? In *Randolph* Fourth Amendment doctrine became a tableau of these contested visions of the home. The debate over privacy as a woman, namely what sort of woman she is, seems to reflect a familiar sexist world in which men determine women’s reputations. But alongside that debate, the Justices’ debate over the meaning of Fourth Amendment privacy is in effect a debate between different sorts of feminism, itself a house divided.

The Exemplary Woman?
Defining wife-beating as a social problem, not merely a phenomenon of particular violent individuals or relationships, was one of the great achievements of feminism.

--Linda Gordon\textsuperscript{120}

As the feminist impact on our law has reached a certain maturity, we have seen discourses in major areas of constitutional jurisprudence shaped by the idea of protecting women in the home. The Fourth Amendment would be one area in an emerging pattern that includes, for example, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Domestic violence enforcement in particular has not only been recognized as an important legal issue, but is structuring the way the Court talks about constitutional rules. Indeed, only several years after the Court struck down provisions of the federal Violence Against Women Act in \textit{United States v. Morrison},\textsuperscript{121} which some feminist scholars took to be an open repudiation of women in our constitutional framework,\textsuperscript{122} the influence of the issue of violence against women in constitutional law comes into its own.

The Supreme Court’s first thorough discussion of the issue of spousal abuse was at a crucial moment in the development of the right to privacy, \textit{Planned Parenthood v. Casey},\textsuperscript{123} which reaffirmed the core holding of \textit{Roe v. Wade}.\textsuperscript{124} One of \textit{Casey}’s holdings was that the provision of the Pennsylvania abortion law requiring husband notification imposed an undue burden on the woman’s abortion decision. In this context, the Court explicitly drew the connection between domestic violence and marriage, which we also saw emerge in the debate over Fourth Amendment privacy in \textit{Randolph}. After reciting
extensive statistics on domestic violence in the United States, the Court in *Casey* reasoned, consistent with “what common sense would suggest”: “In well-functioning marriages, spouses discuss important intimate decisions such as whether to bear a child. But there are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion. Many may have justifiable fears of physical abuse . . .”125 Many married women’s fear of domestic violence would prevent them from discussing the abortion decision with their husbands and thus prevent them from having abortions, “as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”126

With respect to the potential impact of the husband notification provision, the battered woman was to be taken as the exemplary woman. Though the husband notification provision “impose[d] almost no burden at all for the vast majority of women seeking abortions,” and might in reality affect “fewer than one percent of women seeking abortions,”127 the Court thought that the provision was invalid on its face: “The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects.”128 The battered woman then was the woman whose conduct the abortion law affected, and as such exemplified women’s liberty threatened.

Like Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in *Randolph*, *Casey* featured a reflection on changes in the legal meaning of marriage. Reasoning from the scenario of abusive husbands preventing wives from seeking abortions, whether through “physical force or psychological pressure or economic coercion,”129 the Court in *Casey* did not
believe the Constitution would “permit the State to empower [the husband] with this troubling degree of authority over his wife.”

Thus the Court in *Casey* described its striking down of the husband notification provision as a feminist implementation of the equality of wives in marriage—not allowing states to “give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over children.” The husband notification provision reflected an outdated conception of marriage consistent with coverture. “There was a time, not so long ago, when a different understanding of the family and of the Constitution prevailed. . . . Only one generation has passed since this Court observed that ‘woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life,’ with attendant ‘special responsibility’ that precluded full and independent legal status under the Constitution.” The husband notification provision thus “embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage, and of the nature of rights secured by the Constitution.” Striking down the provision was to give effect to changed legal understandings of marriage and the status of women.

The marker of the changed understanding of the family and of the Constitution was the figure of the battered woman. By presenting her as the exemplary woman, the Court foregrounded misunderstandings of marriage as a relationship in which women fear abuse by their husbands. The woman we have after the formal demise of coverture is the battered woman. The modern marital home is exemplified by potential violence. The husband’s “troubling degree of authority” over his wife arises from this violence threat. It is the recognition of women’s potential to be “victims of regular physical and
psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands” that remakes the family in the
constitutional imagination in a world where coverture is formally dismantled.\textsuperscript{135}

If \textit{Kyllo}’s lady in the bath is a trace of the common law wife, then the battered
wife—who appeared first in \textit{Casey}, and later in \textit{Randolph}—is the contemporary woman
of legal feminism. The privacy of coverture is the privacy of the master of the house. It
is of course no coincidence that \textit{Roe v. Wade}, which conceptualized the abortion right as
a privacy right, was also famously paternalistic, imagining the privacy as that of the male
doctor at least as much as that of the woman.\textsuperscript{136} The battered woman revamps that kind
of privacy and stands instead for the protection of a woman by the state against a
husband’s coercion. Both of these figures for privacy—figures of the woman at home—
shape the law of privacy and the home.

The Absent Woman?

Suppose privacy is a woman—what then?\textsuperscript{137}

In the decades since the Supreme Court declared that “woman is still regarded as
the center of home and family life,”\textsuperscript{138} constitutional privacy has been prominently
charted through issues that unavoidably involve women’s bodies—sex, contraception,
procreation, abortion.\textsuperscript{139} Even \textit{Stanley v. Georgia}, prototype of First Amendment home
privacy, involved the right to observe women’s bodies and sex in the form of
pornography.\textsuperscript{140} In \textit{Casey}, quoting \textit{Stanley}’s statement, Justice Stevens’ separate opinion
declared: “‘Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men’s minds.’ The same holds true for the power to control women’s
bodies.”\textsuperscript{141} Men’s minds and women’s bodies. The move from rejecting government
control of men’s minds (the classic preoccupation of which is women’s bodies) to rejecting government control of women’s bodies is in sum a heroic story of privacy’s progress, tied to the heroic story of women’s progress from coverture to equality under the Constitution.¹⁴²

If women have been a crucial presence in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence, in this respect Lawrence v. Texas,¹⁴³ which struck down a law that prohibited gay sex, represents an anomalous culmination. In other words, if sex and women are embedded in the core of modern substantive due process privacy, Lawrence involved the constitutional status of sex in which no woman was a participant.¹⁴⁴ But Lawrence’s holding, language, and constitutional import were of course broader than gay sex.¹⁴⁵

The opening words of Lawrence immediately placed the home in the foreground as the structure that housed the concepts of liberty and privacy: “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition, the State is not omnipresent in the home.”¹⁴⁶ Justice Kennedy insisted that more than merely a right to perform particular sex acts was at stake. Framing it that way would “demean” the claim of the gay couple “just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”¹⁴⁷ Justice Kennedy proposed instead that the issue was the freedom to form intimate relationships that include, but are not reducible to, erotic acts. The route to constructing this broad conception of the right ran explicitly through the home: “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”¹⁴⁸ Not coincidentally, Kennedy located the sex act within a “personal relationship” that “adults may choose to enter . . . in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring."

The privacy of the home, then, shields erotic acts from public view. But it also accentuates the possibility of an intimate relationship (nonexistent in the facts of the case) parallel to marriage that dignifies the sex act and makes it worth protecting. We might perhaps map this dual role of the home in Lawrence—foregrounding a relationship openly compared to marriage while obscuring the sex act actually protected—onto a social geography that the sociologist Erving Goffman has called “front region” and “back region.” These regions, “illustrated everywhere in our society,” correspond to the public rooms of the house—such as the parlor where one might display respectability and observe social rules, and the private rooms—such as the bedroom or bathroom where one could relax such polite performance. Marriage-like domestic performance then—Lawrence’s “personal bond that is more enduring”—is front region performance, and gay sex—“certain intimate sexual conduct”—is back region behavior.

As we have seen, the social geography of privacy evinces anxiety about intrusion into private space identified with women, whether expressed as penetration of the home of the lady in the bath, or the impertinent intrusion on the lady “not at home” to callers. The privacy in Lawrence, though, is that of two men engaged in a sex act. But it turns out that the imperative to protect the home against intrusion still applies. Within the Victorianized demands of social discipline and expressive control, back region behavior needs be confined to the back regions and not intrude into the front regions. To return for a moment to the topic of calling, it was important that a caller invited to partake of the
polite performance of the front regions not intrude into the back regions, to avoid disrupting the lady of the house engaged in activities properly kept concealed: “You may find her washing, or dressing, or in bed, or even engaged in repairing clothes—or the room may be in great disorder, or the chambermaid in the act of cleaning it.”

Keeping back region behavior at bay in the well-ordered home meant that the polite caller did not enter those private rooms.

Recalling Laurence Tribe’s statement that the relevant question for *Bowers v. Hardwick* “is not what Michael Hardwick was doing in the privacy of his own bedroom, but what the State of Georgia was doing there,” one is tempted simply to assimilate Lawrence’s overruling of *Bowers* into Professor Tribe’s critique of *Bowers*, as a decision disallowing state intrusion into the bedroom. It must also be noticed, however, that within Lawrence’s famously hetero-normative home discourse of domesticity and relationships, it was as if a front region performance of marriage-like intimacy were intruding on the back region conduct of private gay sex. Echoing Professor Tribe with a difference, we might suggest that a question here is not what Lawrence was doing in the privacy of his own bedroom, but what a woman was doing there. After all, even the holding, which struck a statute against “homosexual sodomy” by announcing a constitutional right covering private consensual adult sex, seemed bent on moving heterosexual sex into the frame.

Searching *Lawrence* for an answer leads to Justice Kennedy’s quotation of *Casey* describing the privacy right at its most transcendent and elusive: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Justice Scalia in his *Lawrence* dissent, which ridiculed the
“famed sweet-mystery-of life passage,” intuited what the mystery of life was, in calling it sweet.\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Casey}, of course, was about abortion, and so unavoidably about a woman’s body. If liberty in \textit{Lawrence} provides a person refuge in his home and private life, perhaps what disturbed Justice Scalia so was the incongruity of the unavoidable invocation of woman, the sweet mystery at the center of the home, in this case precisely involving sex with no woman. Her absent presence in \textit{Lawrence} underscores how intertwined the woman is with the home itself.

It is difficult to think of privacy in the home without imagining a woman, and the way she is imagined is bound up with the stakes of privacy both articulated and unspoken. Privacy is the lady of the house in the bath, the lady receiving callers, the battered wife in the disordered home. She embodies the sweet mystery of life, the imaginative essence of the privacy that the Constitution protects. At home in the law, she is the wife of ambiguous virtue, the matron of bourgeois society, the victim of domestic violence. She represents contestation and ambivalence over the meanings and consequences of privacy in our legal tradition and evolving legal present.
Chapter 5: Is Privacy a Woman?


3 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.


6 Id. at 34.

7 Id. See also id. at 40 (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’ That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.”) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).

8 See id. at 31 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

9 See id. at 32 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-35, 239 (1986)).

10 Id. at 34.

11 Id. at 35-36.

Kyllo, 533 U.S at 40.

Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id. at 37-38 (majority opinion).

Id. at 37.

Id. at 38 (emphasis added).

See, e.g., M.W. Ellsworth & F.B. Dickerson, The Successful Housekeeper 473 (1882) (“[T]he lady of the house . . . takes the head of the table, and the master of the house the same.”); The Habits of Good Society 886 (1869) (“[I]n leaving cards you must thus distribute them: one for the lady of the house . . . one for the master of the house . . . .”).

For a useful discussion of the “multiple and contingent values” in the construction of legal privacy, see Peter Galison & Martha Minow, Our Privacy, Ourselves in the Age of Technological Intrusions, in Human Rights in the “War on Terror” 258-94, 268-73, 268 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005) (describing legal privacy as “[p]redicated on plural and at times inconsistent social values”).

On reading the discourse of Supreme Court opinions, see Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking.
in the Taft Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267, 1289 (2001) (“A Supreme Court opinion is not merely a statement of the law. It is a written intervention, addressed to particular audiences, and designed to accomplish particular ends.”); see also PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 4 (2000) (“[A] result of the recent cross-disciplinary infiltration of interpretive theory from literary studies into legal studies has been a questioning of the law’s internal definitions of some of its terms of art: a challenge to the notion that any act of interpretation is unproblematic, that it can refer to any principles that are not themselves products of acts of interpretation, that it does not reveal preferences, exclusions, unexamined assumptions that need testing against ordinary language and belief.”); CATHERINE GALLAGHER & STEPHEN GREENBLATT, PRACTICING NEW HISTORICISM 9 (2000) ("[A]ny attempt at interpretation . . . bears a certain inescapable tinge of aggression . . . . The notion of culture as text . . . vastly expands the range of objects available to be read and interpreted" including "texts that have been regarded as altogether nonliterary, that is, as lacking the aesthetic polish, the self-conscious use of rhetorical figures, the aura of distance from the everyday world, the marked status of fiction that separately or together characterize belles lettres."); cf. Robert L. Caserio, Supreme Court Discourse vs. Homosexual Fiction, 88.1 S. ATLANTIC Q. 267, 272, 277 (1989) ("[T]he all-suspecting method of ideological narrative poetics is well suited to reading Supreme Court discourse – even though this is to admit that the ideological study of fictional narrative is most fruitful when, oddly enough, it is applied elsewhere – to non-narratives or to anti-narrative discourses that are not novelistic or fictional.”) (analyzing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); cf. also DEBORAH
NELSON, PURSUING PRIVACY IN COLD WAR AMERICA (2002) (closely analyzing the concept of privacy in Supreme Court opinions alongside readings of confessional poetry).

21 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”).

22 Id.

23 The “repulsive” conduct is of course the snooping, but perhaps also by association, the sex. Cf. David Allen Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 875, 916-18 (2008) (suggesting that the reaction of disgust at the policing of gay sex may be transference of disgust at gay sex).


25 According to the Greek poet Callimachus, Athena would forgive the violation but cannot, because the injury was not her outrage but against the law of her father. See CALLIMACHUS, THE FIFTH HYMN (A.W. Bulloch ed. & trans., 1985).


27 See 2 Samuel 11 – 12:25.

The subject of Susanna and the Elders, which “has a long and venerable history, beginning with catacomb paintings,” “enjoyed particular popularity after the mid-cinquecento . . . .” Edward J. Olszewski, Expanding the Litany for Susanna and the Elders, 26.3 SOURCE: NOTES IN THE HISTORY OF ART 42, 42, 46 (2007); Susanne Dunlap, Susanna and the Male Gaze: The Musical Iconography of a Baroque Heroine, 5 WOMEN & MUSIC 40, 40 (2001) (“The apocryphal story of Susanna has long been a popular subject for artistic treatment in a variety of media.”).


assumed an extraordinary prominence across the conflicting visual cultures of a divided Christendom”).


37 Id. at 47.

38 Id. at 44.

39 See id.

40 Id. at 36 n.3 (majority opinion).

41 Id. at 36.

42 Id. at 40.

43 Id. at 43 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)) (Stevens, J., dissenting).


46 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107.

47 Id. at 106-07.

48 Id. at 107.

49 Id.

50 See id.


53 Id. at 4.

54 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.

55 Id. at 113.

56 Cf., e.g., William H. Freivogel, Courtly: Souter is Formal But Relaxed, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 26, 1990, at 1C (“[Friends] portray [Souter] as a 19th-century man fond of tradition . . . .”); David Margolick, Bush’s Court Choice; Ascetic at Home but Vigorous on Bench, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at A1 (quoting a friend describing Souter as “‘in the 18th-century mold.’ He has ‘magnificent handwriting that looks like calligraphy,’ and is courtly and unfailingly polite”); Margaret Carlson Washington, An 18th Century Man, Time, Aug. 6, 1990 (“Souter’s social activities resemble those of an 18th century gentleman . . . .”). The portrayal of society in the American novel of manners, such as in the works of Edith Wharton and Henry James, could hardly be lost on the famously literate Justice Souter. E.g., Henry James, The Ambassadors; Henry James, The American; Edith Wharton, The Age of Innocence; Edith Wharton, House of Mirth.

57 See, e.g., Charles William Day, Hints on Etiquette and the Usages of Society; with a Glance at Bad Habits 11 (1844) (“Etiquette is a barrier which society draws around itself as a protection against offences the ‘law’ cannot touch.”); Karen Halitunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America, 1830-1870, at 102, 112 (1982); A Woman of Fashion, Etiquette for Americans 5 (1898) (“[T]here is no ordinance in the social legislation which does not confer comfort for obedience, and no well-established usage that has not been founded for that reason.”); id. at 11 (“Manners, like everything else in life, have to
be learned by rule.”); SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK 5 (1892) (describing the social etiquette of New York as “a law unto itself”);

58 See ETIQUETTE FOR AMERICANS, supra note 57, at 52 (“You announce that you will be at home between certain hours; your friends, in walking costume, wait upon you.”); SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 92-93 (describing customary forms of invitation to tea and coffee using the “at home” formulation).

59 See ETIQUETTE FOR AMERICANS, supra note 57, at 48-49 (“A man in this country must be asked to call, before he may venture to do so. . . He then calls as soon as possible after the invitation is given”); id. at 49-50 (“[T]he receiving party is always a woman, of course. . . . It is always the wife who receives, not the husband.”); SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 78-79 (indicating that “[a]fter a gentleman has been presented to a lady,” “[h]e must bide his time until an acquaintance through mutual friends disposes the lady to open the doors of her home to him,” and that “[h]e is permitted at first to call upon formal receiving days”).

60 See SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 78-89 (describing calling card etiquette for gentlemen).

61 See ETIQUETTE FOR AMERICANS, supra note 57, at 47 (“Put your card on a convenient place in the hall, or on the tray the servant holds out for you, and mention your name to the manservant, if there is one. A man or a maid usually takes the card on a tray, and stands holding the curtains (perhaps) aside, for you to enter, speaking your name audibly at the same time.”).

62 SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 82.
See EMILY POST, ETIQUETTE IN SOCIETY, IN BUSINESS, POLITICS AND AT HOME 43-45 (New York 1922) ("When a servant at the door says, ‘Not at home,’ this phrase means that the lady of the house is ‘Not at home to visitors.’ This answer neither signifies nor implies – nor is it intended to – that Mrs. Jones is out of the house."). See also HALTTUNEN, supra note 57, at 112.

A nineteenth-century English travelogue writer comments: “No one dreams of fastening a door in Western America . . . . I was thus exposed to perpetual, and most vexatious interruptions from people whom I had often never seen . . . .” FRANCES TROLLOPE, DOMESTIC MANNERS OF THE AMERICANS 100 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949).

HALTTUNEN, supra note 57, at 6.

Id. at 82.

SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 14.

Id. at 9.

Id.

DAY, supra note 57, at 11.

Callers were not exclusively gentlemen, however. See SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 77 (describing calling etiquette for ladies).

By contrast, in characterizing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), in which the Court had previously held that the police may enter with one occupant’s consent in the other occupant’s absence, Justice Souter wrote: “When someone comes to the door of a domestic dwelling with a baby at her hip, as Mrs. Graff did, she shows that she belongs there, and that fact standing alone is enough to tell a law enforcement officer or any other visitor that if she occupies the place along with others, she probably lives there subject to
the assumption tenants usually make about their common authority when they share
quarters. They understand that any one of them may admit visitors, with the consequence
that a guest obnoxious to one may nevertheless be admitted in his absence by another.”
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006). The effect of the contrast between the
woman who answers the door with a baby at her hip and that of the caller is subtly to
underscore the class difference between the kind of home the police enter and the kind
they may not. Matlack apparently featured a domestic situation that did not immediately
imply a well-ordered nuclear family in a conventional marital home. See Matlock, 415
U.S. at 166 (“The home was leased from the owner by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall. Living in
the home were Mrs. Marshall, several of her children, including her daughter Mrs. Gayle
Graff, Gayle's three-year-old son, and respondent.”).

73 SOCIAL ETIQUETTE OF NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 7.

74 Id.

75 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113.

76 See, e.g., Daphne Merkin, Behind Closed Doors: The Last Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 117 (“Ours is the Age of Un-innocence. . . . These days, the
classic codes of social behavior no longer apply.”).

77 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 139 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

78 Id. at 131.

79 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 87 (2000)

80 See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 7-9 (1987); Reva B. Siegel, “The
81 See, e.g., DOBASH & DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST PARIARCHY (1979); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976); SCHNEIDER, supra note xx.

82 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 80.

83 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 139.

84 See id. at 118 (majority opinion) (“No question has been raised . . . about the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence . . . .”).

85 Id.


87 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.

88 Id. at 118-19.

89 Id. at 117-18.

90 Id. at 119.

91 Id. at 125-26 (Breyer, J., concurring).

92 Id. at 127.

93 Id.

94 Id. at 124 (Stevens, J. concurring).
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, *The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930*, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127 (1994) (“For centuries the common law of coverture gave husbands rights in their wives’ property and earnings, and prohibited wives from contracting, filing suit, drafting wills, or holding property in their own names.”).

*Randolph*, 547 U.S. at 124-25.

*Id.* at 125.

*Id.* at 144-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

*Id.* at 145.


Nancy Cott characterizes this feminist move thus: “If domestic violence was going to be prosecuted and if a husband’s exemption from rape charges for coercing his wife into sex was going to be eliminated, then the zone of domestic privacy had to be opened up and the notion that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ unseated.”  *Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* 210 (2000) (citation omitted).

See, e.g. *Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman* (1979); Sarah M. Buel, *Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay*, 28 Colo. Law. 19 (1999) (“Domestic violence victims stay for many valid reasons that must be understood by lawyers, judges, and the legal community if they are to stem the tide of homicides, assaults, and other abusive behavior.”).

Hammon was decided as a companion to Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.


Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.

Id.

Id.

Later in the same Term, in another Fourth Amendment case about entry into a home, the Court held that the police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with injury. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). Here the police were responding to a call about a loud party where, it turned out, teenagers were in a violent altercation. Id. at 400-01. The Court’s opinion did not explicitly highlight domestic violence implications, but the briefs and oral argument did. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502) (citation and footnote omitted) (“Domestic violence calls are ‘one of the most common and volatile settings for serious
injury or death.’ Not surprisingly, almost all deaths and serious injuries suffered as a result of domestic relationships--i.e., intimate partner and child abuse--occur inside homes, where the victims’ ability to obtain the assistance of anyone other than intervening police is remote.”) (citation omitted); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502) (“[T]his Court’s recent decision in Georgia v. Randolph contains a clear expression of concern for the need for the police to take prompt action to prevent harm in domestic violence cases.”).

111 An analogous debate among Justices about Constitutional rights in light of the need to protect against domestic violence was visible in Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).


113 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 142 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

114 Id.


116 Id. at 52 (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)).

117 Id. at 52-53.

118 Cf. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 643 (1983) (“Liberal strategies entrust women to the state. Left theory abandons us to the rapists and batterers.”).

119 The divisions within feminism has, of course, a contested history. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006); see also MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M.
VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (2006); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds. 1991); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds. 2003).

120 LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES 251 (1988).

121 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

122 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Comment, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); see also, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 113 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that “feminists in the United States are still smarting from the United States Supreme Court’s invalidation of the key provisions of the federal Violence Against Women Act”).


125 Casey, 505 U.S. at 892-93.

126 Id. at 894.

127 Id.

128 Id.

129 Id. at 897.

130 Id. at 898.

131 Id.

132 Id. at 896-97 (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“[P]rior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated.”).

Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (“Supposing that truth is a woman – what then?”); cf. also BARBARA JOHNSON, Women and Allegory, in THE WAKE OF DECONSTRUCTION 52-75, 52-61 (1994) (asking “Is Theory a Woman?”).

Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, by a defendant charged with killing her husband with a baseball bat, to a statute providing for jury service by women only if they register their desire to serve on a jury).


394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969). The films seized by the police from the home in Stanley were described in the government’s brief to the Court as “depicting sodomy, nudity and sexual intercourse. . . .” Brief for Appellee at 7, Stanley v. Georgia, supra.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See my discussion of Randolph above.


146 *Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 562.

147 *Id.* at 567.

148 *Id.* at 567.

149 *Id.*


151 See Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* 107 (Anchor Books 1959) (1956) (describing a person’s performance in a “front region” as “an effort to give the appearance that his activity in the region maintains and embodies certain standards” such as “politeness” and “decorum”); *id* at 111-12 (referring to a “back region” as a place where “suppressed” activities and facts that “might discredit the fostered impression . . . make an appearance”).
See id. at 123 (noting that the front region / back region divide exists “in all but lower-class homes”).

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.

Id. at 562.

This point with respect to Lawrence was performed during a large public Q & A session with Justice Scalia at New York University School of Law in 2005, when a law student asked him, “Do you sodomize your wife?” In a subsequent letter to classmates, the student explained that he “asked him if he sodomizes his wife to subject his intimate relations to the scrutiny he cavalierly would allow others – by force, if necessary. Everyone knew at the moment how significant the interest is.” See Debriefing Scalia, THE NATION, April 18, 2005, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050502/berndt.

ELIZA LESLIE, MISS LESLIE’S BEHAVIOR BOOK: A GUIDE AND MANUAL OF POLITENESS; BEING A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LADIES 4 (1857).


Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).