Hobbes and the Wolf-Man:
Melancholy and Animality in Modern Sovereignty
(WORK IN PROGRESS PLEASE DO NOT CITE)

Diego Rossello
Northwestern University
d-rossello@northwestern.edu

Abstract

Homo homini lupus, man is a wolf to man, remains one of the most well-known and often quoted dictums in the tradition of political theory. Political theorists take this phrase by Thomas Hobbes in the Epistle Dedicatory of De Cive to illustrate the brutish, anarchical and violent condition of man in the natural condition, prior to the establishment of a civil state. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I suggest that this brief passage directs our attention to lycanthropy: an acute melancholic syndrome which 17th century physiologists thought could turn humans into animals. I suggest that Hobbes’s political theory stands for a therapeutic intervention to curb the lycanthropic tendencies of his time. Hobbes’s shock therapy implies leaving animality behind, as non-political, and securing human politicality in an artificial commonwealth. However, Hobbes’s intervention will be insufficient, as the animality left behind, excluded from the realm of politics, will return reinstating the symptoms of lycanthropy.
He [Hobbes] was sanguineo-melancholicus; which the physiologers say is the most ingenious complexion.

John Aubrey, *Brief Lives*

Sir, sorrow was not ordained for beasts but men, yet if men do exceed in it they become beasts.

Sancho Panza, *Don Quixote*

The King would call him [Hobbes] “The Bear” “Here comes the bear to be baited!”

John Aubrey, *Brief Lives*

*Homo homini lupus*, man is a wolf to man\(^1\) remains one of the most well-known and often quoted dictums in the tradition of political theory. Political theorists, but also political scientists across sub-fields, take this phrase by Thomas Hobbes in the Epistle Dedicatory of *De Cive* to illustrate the brutish, anarchical, and violent condition of man in the natural state, prior to the establishment of a civil government. This assimilation of Hobbes’s dictum to a state of war of all against all may be well grounded, but it can also conceal the obvious. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I suggest that this brief passage directs our attention to two neglected yet interrelated topics in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty: The question of the animal and melancholy.

Our attention has to be re-directed to these notions because the reception of the political theory of Hobbes has been working within a humanist consensus. This consensus takes for granted the distinction between human and animal in Hobbes’s political theory and limits in consequence the textual and contextual questions that Hobbes’s scholars can think to ask. Most notably, contemporary contextualist historians ground their methodology on the notions of speech act and authorial intentionality. Therefore the question of “the animal” --a creature assumed to have no speech and no intentional consciousness-- remains a blind spot in their approach to Hobbes.\(^2\) In this “context”, the animal is always-already out of context. Although
this paper does not hinge upon a detailed discussion of the contemporary reception of Hobbes, I shall draw on a few examples of the humanist consensus to show the ways in which Hobbes’s scholars dwell on the human-animal divide without identifying its underlying implications for Hobbes’s political theory.

This humanist bias means Hobbes’s scholars are inattentive to a somewhat bizarre, and yet theoretically substantial, articulation of melancholy and animality in Hobbes’s time: lycanthropy. Lycanthropy was a peculiar kind of melancholic syndrome that Hobbes’s contemporaries (but also psychiatrists today) described as the delusional experience of turning into an animal—often, but not exclusively, into a wolf.⁴ Scholars in literary studies alert us that in Late Renaissance and Early Modern Europe the belief in the possibility that human beings overwhelmed by passions might turn into beasts was sustained by physiologists and moral theorists alike. Erica Fudge, for instance, helps us see the importance of forms of inner government for the stability of the human condition. Fudge draws on Robert Burton, a clergyman Oxford fellow expert on melancholy, and contemporary to Hobbes, to argue that it was crucial to keep “ferall passions”⁴ at bay as “[w]e are torn in pieces by our passions, as so many wild horses, one in disposition, another in habit; one is melancholy another mad.”⁵

Whether Hobbes as an individual was affected by melancholy is not an issue this paper will try to address. Several biographers and commentators claim that he was, and it is not my intention to dispute them.⁶ Instead, my aim is to show that Hobbes’s political theory exhibits the symptoms of melancholic lycanthropy. But positing the relevance of lycanthropy for political theory is not an easy task. Although by late Renaissance and Early Modernity the lycanthrope had already captured the attention of Augustine, Jean Bodin, James I and Robert Burton, among several authors, by the 21st century a robust combination of mythology, folk tales, gothic literary
and cinematic imagination, and pop culture has confined the lycanthrope to the realm of the fantastic; accompanied by vampires, fauns, centaurs, unicorns and other extraordinary creatures. During Hobbes's formative years, however, lycanthropy was shifting from a predominantly theological interpretation, which took it for a demonic possession, to a physiological one that conceived it as the product of an acute melancholic syndrome. Interestingly, political theory was undergoing a similarly incomplete transformation in late Renaissance and Early Modern England: it was shifting from the divinely ordained foundations of political authority to a physiological understanding of the commonwealth as a body politic.

But the family resemblances in these shifts from the theological to the physiological do not account for the centrality of shape-shifting as such. After all, the entire European culture was undergoing a similar transformation from a theological worldview to an incipiently scientific one. In this context, why should we care about lycanthropy? What does lycanthropy have to do with political theory anyway? To the staunch skeptic I shall begin to respond with a letter by the English historian of royalist leanings James Howell who, in 1644, reacted to the events of the English Civil War in the following terms: “I must resent the calamities of the time, and the desperate case of this nation, who seem to have fallen quite from the very faculty of reason, and to be possessed with a pure lycanthropy, with a wolfish kind of disposition to tear one another in this manner […] They err who write no wolves in England range / Here men are all turned wolves, O monstrous change.” Although I cannot prove here that Howell knew about Hobbes’s reference to the arrant wolf in the Epistle of Dedicatory of De Cive, his observation strikes me as very Hobbesian nonetheless. It retains from Hobbes the sense of urgency and despair of a nation undergoing an acute crisis of political authority and of a people whose reason appeared to have been overwhelmed by the contentious passions stirred by civil war. If, as Howell argues, “men
are all turned wolves” a political theorist attuned to the problems of her time had to make sure that they regain their composure and be turned back into humans.

And this is precisely what Hobbes strives to do. He attempts to curb the wolfish humors of his contemporaries through his political theory. This therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s political theory, however, remains unattended by most commentators as they circumscribe Hobbes’s link to melancholy to a mere biographical note. This is surprising given the fact that in *Leviathan* Hobbes transitions from an analysis of melancholy to an account of the folly of the multitude who will “fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their life-time before, they have been protected, and secured from injury” (L: 55). This abandonment of reason fueled by spiritual malaise and inspiration has fundamental political consequences for Hobbes as it participates of the “Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation” (54, 55). Thus, I shall argue that his political theory acknowledges and diagnoses the lycanthropic tendencies of his time and aims at a therapeutic solution: the establishment of an artificial commonwealth in which humans are no longer wolves of one another. I shall also suggest that despite his efforts to do political theory as a kind of therapy, Hobbes was ultimately unable to work through the lycanthropic tendencies of his time, and that his insights reenact, rather than resolve, these very tendencies.

Once the therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s political theory is posited, and its intervention to curb wolfish humors is introduced, his political thought can be linked with prior attempts to diagnose and remedy melancholy. The work of a handful of commentators suggests that Hobbes would have known Burton’s *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, a book already in its sixth edition by 1651, the year of publication of *Leviathan*. Quentin Skinner, for instance, notes that a volume of *The Anatomy* was present in the Hardwick Library of the Cavendish family used by Hobbes. The historian Noel Malcolm, in turn, asserts that Hobbes sent two of his books to
Burton --the translation of Thucydides’s *The History of the Peloponnesian War* and his *De mirabilibus pecci*-- and that Burton was an acquaintance of Robert Payne, Oxford don, chaplain of the Earl of Newcastle and an old friend of Hobbes.¹¹

But commentators have not gone beyond these traces of personal association to delve into the conceptual affinities between Hobbes and Burton; perhaps because commentators assume that these authors belong to separate realms of scholarship: the former to political thought, the latter to the history of psychiatry. Nevertheless, this disciplinary distinction was not always so obvious. Mauro Simonazzi indicates that Hobbes was included in Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine, *Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry 1535-1860*, published in 1963, as a forerunner of modern psychiatric studies¹² and, I should add, Burton was discussed as a political thinker in J.W. Allen’s *English Political Thought: 1603-1660*, published in 1938.¹³

To be sure, Burton’s *The Anatomy* represents an oblique political commentary on the wolfish humors of his time. Among the plural animal imagery in his text Burton asserts that the melancholic “howls like a wolf” and “barks like a dog” and suggests that even “kingdoms and provinces are melancholy.”¹⁴ Insofar as *The Anatomy* offers a lengthy reflection on the causes, consequences and therapeutic solutions to the saturnine disposition commentators in literary studies are prone to suggest that “Burton’s descriptions of state melancholy anticipate Hobbes’s by employing humoral terminology to describe a country as one might a human body.”¹⁵ But Burton does not only anticipate Hobbes, he also stages his reception: Burton stages the anxieties of the Jacobean (and post-Jacobean) era. Hobbes acknowledges their severity and aims at a sovereign solution; to paraphrase another book on melancholy contemporary to Burton’s: Hobbes brings sovereign comforts to troubled consciousnesses.¹⁶ Thus, whereas Burton's style is chaotic, digressive and meandering, Hobbes's admiration for the deductive consistency of
geometry brings order to Burton's self-confessed “want of good method.” Consequently, why is it that political theorists do not account for this therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s project? What if we think of Hobbes’s political theory –including his geometry inspired method-- as a complex, albeit ultimately insufficient, response to the widespread lycanthropic tendencies described by Burton and Howell?

The contemporary humanist reception of Hobbes discourages such questions when it either assumes the human-animal divide as something given, or actively reinstates this divide when confronted with the ambiguity of the wolf-man. Paradoxically, this humanist reading of Hobbes carries a metaphysical understanding of the human being that Hobbes himself challenged. Accordingly, the image of the wolf-man conveys a first impression –a shocking and unexpected one indeed– which performs a necessary work of de-familiarization from another image of Hobbes that keeps holding us captive. According to this second image, questions of politics, rationality, signification, language and freedom in Hobbes are always-already human questions. It is precisely this assumption of a stable human horizon that I shall contest in what follows, and this can only be done by taking the wolf-man seriously, as indeed did Hobbes himself.

A critical perspective informed by Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida is useful to trace the symptoms of lycanthropy transpiring under the guise of undecidable forms of life –oscillating between human and animal-- in Hobbes’s arguments, and to make sense of several references to these forms of creaturely life in his works. Benjamin focuses on the human-animal problématique as a feature of princely life in his Trauerspiel book. He too is concerned with melancholy but he is interested not only in the melancholic lycanthrope but also in the many other symbols and embodiments of Renaissance and Early Modern melancholy such as dogs,
mad dogs and Saturn, among others.²⁰ I take Benjamin invaluable inventory of saturnine beings as a treasure map that allows me to identify the dwellings of these peculiar beings in Hobbes’s architecture of human politicality.

Derrida, in turn, provides a deconstructive critique of subjectivity that is sensitive to the establishment of frontiers between human and animal, and which questions the superiority of the former over the latter. According to Derrida, humans have been after the animal, chasing it and hunting it down since long ago, and have justified this chase by excluding animality from the realm of *logos*.²¹ Since animals are conceived as lacking speech and reason they remain excluded from the realm of law and politics altogether.²² Benjamin’s and Derrida’s insights meet at the point of intersection between a subtle materialism, which welcomes improbable melancholic beings to the realm of enquiry, and a deconstructive approach to texts and contexts, critical of the ways in which a logocentric perspective sets boundaries between the human and the non-human.

This angle of vision enabled by Benjamin and Derrida also allows me to shed light on aspects of Hobbes’s context often unperceived by contextualist historians. Hobbes’s contemporaries were outraged at his animalization of the human being in the natural condition yet this adverse response has remained underexplored by Hobbes’s scholars.²³ On my reading, Hobbes relaxes the ontological foundations of human dignity assumed by Christian humanism to acknowledge the radical implications of the wolfish humors of his time. By doing so, Hobbes recognizes the stakes of the Civil War: It implied not only the risk of a breakdown in the peaceful human co-existence but also the possibility of losing human status. Most of Hobbes’s critics, however, were open to question the beastly ways of his fellow humans from a moralistic perspective, but they assumed an ontological guarantee that made impossible to conceive the
very problem posited by Hobbes: the possibility of a breakdown of the human condition. Despite the temporal, political and conceptual distances, it might be useful to evoke the intensity of the adverse reaction against Hobbes by thinking of contemporary American creationist opposition to the animalization of the human being allegedly furthered by Darwin’s theory of evolution. This visceral anti-Darwinian reaction alerts us of how shocking Hobbes’s theoretical move of animalization might have been to his Early Modern contemporaries.

This article will proceed as follows. In section one I attend to Hobbes’s conceptual move towards the animalization of the human being. I shall argue that the lycanthropic tendencies of his time lead Hobbes to figure the state of nature as one in which man is a wolf to man. In section two I proceed to show the ways in which Hobbes’s political theory builds a frontier between animal and human, casting the former as non-political and the latter as political. I will also highlight the ambiguities that this movement of humanization of the political brings about. In section three I take issue with what I call the humanist consensus, namely, a way of approaching Hobbes’s political theory that does not attend critically to his project of re-humanization of the political and therefore misses the ambiguities and pathologies generated by his abrupt re-drawing of the human-animal divide. In section four I trace several symptoms of lycanthropy in Hobbes’s political theory such as wolfish voracity, dogs, mad dogs and melancholic men, among others. Through an analysis of these symptoms, I shed light on sovereignty’s implication with a circular logic in the form of a constant albeit futile pursue of wolf and man, of voraciousness and voicing. Section five concludes with a glimpse of new possibilities for political theory suggested by Hobbes’s lycanthrope.

1) Animalizing the Human: Hobbes the Provocateur
Hobbes’s contemporaries were outraged at his depiction of human life in the state of nature. Commentators like Thornton and Moloney convincingly show that Hobbes’s contemporaries perceived him as radically departing from the scriptural account of Creation to posit creatures abandoned by God to a brutish and animalistic existence. However, these scholars remain inattentive to a thread that connects the plurality of reactions against Hobbes’s idiosyncratic redescription of the state of Creation. This thread links Aristotelian scholastics like John Bramhall not only with Cambridge Platonists like Ralph Cudworth but also with royalist statesmen like Edward Hyde, among others. I suggest that this improbable array of oppositions is weaved by the animosity towards Hobbes’s animalization of the human being.

For instance, the Anglican clergy Samuel Parker thought that “[i]t must be supposed, that there was a first author and creator of Mankind” and that if we were to give credit to Hobbes’s account of the natural condition, then “out of Diffidence and Jealousie one of another for want of acquaintance shun’d Society, and withdrew like all other Beasts of Prey into Dens and secret Retirements, where they lived poor and solitary as Bats and Owls, and subsisted like Vermine by robbing and filching from one another.” The Archbishop John Bramhall also took issue with Hobbes’s animalization of the human being. He argued that “the Hobbian nature of man, is worse than the nature of Bears, or Wolves, or the most savage wild beasts.” He added that “[i]f God would have had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears or tigers, he would have armed them with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks.” Hobbes’s state of nature was such a bizarre construct to Bramhall that he could only make sense of it by supposing that “some remnant of men, either chased by war or persecution, or forced out of the habitable world for some crimes by themselves committed […] by long conversing with savage beasts, lions, bears, wolves, and tigers, should in time become more ‘brutish’ (it is his own epithet) than the brutes themselves.”
Accordingly, Bramhall asked himself: “would any man in his right wits make that to be the universal condition of mankind […] which was not the state of nature, but an accidental degeneration?”

Another clergyman, William Lucy, added to Bramhall’s indictment that Hobbes’s account of the natural condition as a state of war would make “Men to be beasts, or if they have more wit than beasts, to be by that only enabled to be more barbarous and beastly than Beasts themselves.” The politician, lawyer and historian Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, hold that God created man at his image and gave him dominion over all things created, and therefore “to uncreate him to such a baseness and villany in his nature, as to make man such a Rascal, and more a Beast in his frame and constitution than those he is appointed to govern, is a power that God never gave to the Devil; nor hath anybody assumed it, till Mr. Hobbes took it upon him.”

The Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth referred to Hobbes in similar terms, but focused his critique on Hobbes’s blatant disrespect for the hierarchy of creatures provided by the chain of Being; he contended that: “[h]e that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster […] hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him.”

John Vesey, the biographer of Brahmall, deployed less of a concern with philosophical and metaphysical questions and qualified Hobbes simply as a “pandor to bestiality.”

But Hobbes not only complicates the divinely inspired hierarchy of beings and the biblical account of Creation. He can also be read as reworking early 17th century Christian diagnosis and therapeutics of lycanthropy in an unsettling way. Let us consider briefly the 1615 sermon “Lycanthropy; or The Wolf Worrying the Lambs” by the Calvinist preacher Thomas Adams. The sermon dwells on Luke 10:3 that reads as follows: “Behold, I send you forth as lambs among wolves.” Since Christ sends his seventy disciples as lambs among wolves, Adams
takes wolves as figurations of sinners whose defining characteristics are “reviling, swearing, blaspheming, abusing, slandering; for this is a wolfish language.” 34 Contrary to the lupine ways of the sinners, the preacher recommends remaining pure and innocent as a lamb to the eyes of God, and sees a future according to Isaac 65:25 where “[t]he wolf and the lamb shall feed together”. This prophecy is not devoid of obstacles, however, since Adams acknowledges that only “when wolves become lambs […] this peace may be fulfilled. But wolves, while they are wolves, will not let the lambs live in quiet.” 35 Insofar as the only reward an innocent lamb can expect in Hobbes’s state of nature is a violent death, his argument seems to have no room for Christ’s emissaries. By taking the wolffish disposition of men condemned by Adams as the basic assumption of his political theory, Hobbes’s re-writes the spiritual therapeutics of lycanthropy and assigns the task of taming the wolves to a sovereign authority only.

As it becomes clear, Hobbes’s animalization of the human being upset many people. However, why was this animalization necessary, if at all? The answer could be the following: Hobbes’s move towards the animal is strategic because he chooses to give up a metaphysical understanding of human dignitas in order to recast human politicality in a context of acute religious and political strife. Contrary to his critics, Hobbes knew very well that his account of the human capacity to become beastly would be hard for Christian humanists of the time to accept. If Bramhall can be taken as a representative example of this humanist ethos, it relied on ossified ontological assumptions about human superiority over other creatures that were hard to reconcile with the chaos and brutality deployed in English politics. If Hobbes’s critics reacted so violently to this animalization of men, it is because they perceived, despite themselves, how useless it was to invoke the old dogmas of human dignity, based on the possession of a soul, reason, and free will when confronted with the spectacle of a bloody civil war. Thus, when
Hobbes characterized the life outside of a political community as “brutish” (L: 89) and “savagery” (DC: 40), and included scenes of wild men predating on each other in the frontispiece of *De Cive* many of his contemporaries got the message, and abhorred it. Nevertheless, Hobbes’s animalization of the human being does not occur without crucial qualifications. The move towards the animal is then tempered, or even tamed, by Hobbes when he vigilantly constructs a frontier between animality and politics.

2) De-Animalizing the Political: Leaving the Wolf Behind?

This frontier is built upon a distinction between sociability in the animal kingdom and politicality among humans. Unlike the Aristotle of the *The History of Animals*, Hobbes thinks that the “gathering together” of certain animals is “not to be termed political” (DC: 168). Also against Aristotle in *The Politics*, he asserts that humans are not driven towards a political community by nature but only by artifice (169). According to Hobbes, humans are a peculiar kind of animal that needs to create and shape its own political existence in order to survive. Since Hobbes situates the human animal in a beastly natural state that is not political, he has to carefully extract the creature from this condition by means of an artifice that can enact, sustain and reproduce a certain form of politicality. According to Hobbes, human animals depend on the artifice of the commonwealth to be what they are; if they fall outside of it, they do not just exit a political order, they default on their humanity: they go back to the brutish existence proper to the “liberty of the beasts.”

To put it differently, falling back into the natural condition implies undergoing a process of de-humanization: it means becoming more animal than human. Norberto Bobbio grasped this idea in Hobbes when he asserted that “the wolf-man is inhuman because it is less than human.”
Thus, I propose to think of Hobbes’s argument in *The Elements of Law, De Cive* and *Leviathan* as comprising three overall claims: 1) humans are animals; 2) animals are not political; and 3) human animals *can be* political by the use of words, which is to say that being human is a process: the precarious and unstable result of humanization. 1) Humans are animals because Hobbes challenges human exceptionalism in the Christian sense by depriving human-animals from any exceptional faculty (spirit, reason, and free will) that would distinguish them from non-human animals. It is only by “Speech, and Method”, namely, by the use of words and by regulating mental discourse, that human animals can distinguish themselves “from all other living Creatures” (L: 23). 2) Animals are not political because, as it was state above, Hobbes questions Aristotle’s encompassing notion of politics that groups human beings together with bees, wasps, ants and cranes. Hobbes holds that ants and bees, as well as other animals, should not be termed political because “their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object not (as is necessary in civil government) one will” (DC: 168; L: 119). Moreover, since contracts cannot be made with beasts, non-human animals cannot access Hobbes’s only path towards politicality (DC: 128; L: 97). 3) Then, human animals *can be* political through the use of language because, as Philip Pettit has recently argued, they use words to ratiocinate, personate and incorporate. But the use of words does not secure their humanity once and for all.

If Hobbes’s argument is faithfully represented in the three steps above it remains highly ambiguous. It is clear that, according to Hobbes, non-human animals should not be termed political and that therefore their natural gregariousness or forms of organization—a bee hive, for instance—cannot be counted as a genuine civil government. Moreover, humans are also animals themselves and, as in the case of the “savage people in many places of America” mentioned
twice in Leviathan, their natural gregariousness belongs to the realm of non-politicality (L: 232, 459). According to Hobbes, if left to their natural condition humans will continue to lead a brutish and savage existence, a form of life that emphasizes the non-political, animal dimension in them instead of fulfilling the possibilities latent in speech and ratiocination. For the realization of such possibilities, Hobbes’s therapeutic intervention requires replacing wolfish voracity with human discourse. This explains why Hobbes proceeds by, literally, putting words in our mouths in the form of an utterance in which everyone would say “I authorize and give up my right of governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, an authorize all his Actions in like manner” (L: 120). Contrary to other animals, human animals can be political if, by the use of words, they contract their way into a commonwealth; an entry into politics is also an entry into humanity. However, and more importantly, since humans never cease to be animals themselves they continue to carry the non-political in and with them.

Hence, the wolf-man is a symptom of the ambiguities unleashed by the abrupt conceptual moves of animalization and re-humanization in Hobbes’s political theory. On the one hand, Hobbes responds to the problem of lycanthropy by confining it to the natural condition. On the other, he establishes a conceptual wall between human-animals and non-human animals arguing that only the former can be termed political. These conceptual moves of animalization and re-humanization leave the human-animal trapped in an ontological storm: The wolf-man is thus both a remainder and a reminder of Hobbes’s therapeutic intervention and of its participation in making us who we are, and may continue to be, and in grounding our subjection to political authority. Hobbes’s humanist readers therefore repeat an ostensible effect of Hobbes’s re-
humanization instead of recovering the nuances, complexities and, more importantly, pathologies that go along with this gesture.

In the next section I will show the ways in which the humanist consensus takes Hobbes’s narrative of re-humanization at face value. Instead of following Hobbes’s conceptual movements of animalization and re-humanization, the humanist reception sees in Hobbes a successful and clear cut logical narrative of political humanization. Moreover, as we shall see, humanist scholars seem to participate, perhaps unwillingly, in Hobbes’s efforts to control and dismiss the lycanthropic effects that these brusque movements of animalization and re-humanization both acknowledge and reproduce as a symptom. In this sense, the tone of the 17th century critiques of Hobbes discussed above reminds us of his abrupt shock therapy. Even more so, the reactions of his shocked contemporaries contrast sharply with the humanist self assurance in Hobbes scholarship today. Hobbes’s contemporaries saw in his work an animalization of the human that was, to them, provocative. Why is it no longer provocative to us?

3) The Humanist Consensus and Beyond

The field of Hobbes’s studies has grown exponentially in the last few decades, and several contributions have been made to the textual and contextual understanding of his work. The authors I briefly discuss below are part of the vibrant reception of Hobbes’s political theory and all have made major contributions to the field. Nevertheless, their arguments are still framed within an ongoing accord that requires, and often invokes, the human-animal divide without exploring its broader implications. I will focus on the arguments by Michael Oakeshott, Philip Pettit, and Quentin Skinner because their approaches to Hobbes are representative of this
humanist consensus. I shall also comment on the work of the philosopher of language Anat Biletzski because even though her rhetoric is sympathetic to the wolf-man, her argument ultimately betrays a commitment to humanism.

Oakeshott approaches the limits of the moral space in Hobbes arguing that: “moral conduct concerns the relations of human beings to one another and the power they are capable of exerting over one another. This, no doubt, spills over into other relationships –those with animals, for example, or even with things– but the moral significance of these [relationships] lies solely in their reflection of the dispositions of men towards one another.”41 This argument about morality sounds familiar and is attuned to an established, almost intuitive, perception of our moral allegiances.42 But familiarity indicates, in this case, the product of a long lasting consensus that may desensitize Hobbes scholars to the instability of human nature in his work. Participating in this consensus means not only accepting the claim that we have to prioritize moral obligations with our own species but also that we can establish a clear cut distinction between “us” humans and “them” non-humans. Taking this distinction for granted, however, implies being unable to grasp Hobbes’s political theory as a kind of therapy.

Oakeshott assumes this distinction when he takes Hobbes literally and asserts that: “An animal, for example, may feel pleasure and pain, but its vital movements are affected only by an environment […] its hunger is the hunger of the moment. But human beings have other endowments which amplify the range of their appetites and aversions”.43 At one level, this reconstruction of Hobbes’s argument is sound but it is also incomplete. Hobbes resorts several times to the trope of a wolfish voracity to refer to human political affairs, such as the tension between peoples and monarchs (DC: 89); politics among nations (89) as well as human’s disposition towards the future (OM: 40), among others. Hobbes also mobilizes the laborious
ranging of a hunting dog to exemplify the workings of the human mind (EL: 14; L: 22). If, as Oakeshott argues, the amplitude of human complexity gives rise to a plurality of appetites whose range is foreign to animals, why is it that Hobbes relies on figurations of voracious wolves and hunting dogs to shed light on human affairs and dispositions? What light could they possibly shed?

Pettit’s impressive book on Hobbes also discusses the human-animal divide but ultimately reinstates another—highly nuanced—version of the consensus. In his reading of Hobbes, Pettit expands the significance of language for understanding Hobbes’s political theory. Pettit argues that Hobbes distinguishes a natural-animal mind “particularistic and passive” from a mind that is able to ratiocinate thanks to the use of language. According to Pettit, Hobbes holds “in the most startling and original claim that he makes in the whole of his philosophy” that “language or speech is a historical invention” and that it makes possible the “active form of thinking that we human beings display.” Pettit suggests that Hobbes sticks to a “naturalistic explanation” of the origin of language and holds that it enables humans to “jump the limitation of the natural, animal mind” granting them the possibility to ratiocinate, and giving room to desires “of a reach and kind unknown in other species.”

In conjunction with this argument about the origin and significance of language in Hobbes, Pettit makes an unprecedented albeit problematic move. He decides to add an intermediate stage between the natural condition of man and the commonwealth proposed by Hobbes. Pettit argues that, according to Hobbes, there are three possible modes of human existence: “the state of first nature, when humans are as other animals; the state of second nature, when they leave community with beasts as a result of developing language; and the civil state, in which they incorporate under a sovereign.” Pettit’s re-organization of Hobbes’s
natural condition into two distinctive moments is clearly intended to shed light on the ambivalences of Hobbes’s argument. Here Pettit offers another example of the type of thorough and precise argumentation that he deploys in the book. However, in this particular case, Pettit’s virtues are also his vices, since positing an analytical distinction between a worded and a non-worded state of nature creates problems of its own. For it could be asked: why should we assume that the acquisition of language implies that human-animals leave their community with beasts? Is it merely the fact of language as such that demarcates human from animal and also establishes the former into a political community? It is true that Hobbes claims that “man leaveth all community with beasts at the faculty of imposing names” but he also mentions "curiosity" as equally conducive to this separation (EL: 45). Thus, it is important to note how Pettit’s suggestion performs a certain work. It leaves out of our thinking the possibility that humans never cease to be animals themselves, even after they acquire language, and that therefore they never fully exit, or resign, their “community” with beasts. Pettit seems to be invested in getting rid of the wolf-man but keeping the wolves at bay is harder than one may think.

Pettit acknowledges the liminality of the wolf-man in Hobbes and thinks therapeutically, but ultimately chooses the wrong medicine. In this case posing an analytical distinction between a worded and a non-worded state of nature does not resolve the ambivalence between human and animal, it only reenacts it. But Pettit is not alone in this reenactment. Anat Biletzki joins Pettit in the course of an elucidation of Hobbes’s theory of language by referring to the creatures in Hobbes’s state of nature as “talking wolves.” Biletzki’s talking wolf seems to emerge out of the fusion of Pettit’s first (non worded) and second (worded) states of nature. However, ultimately Biletzki chooses to stay with speech and get rid of the wolf: “[w]e can then diminish
the distance between Aristotle and Hobbes by saying that man to man is a talking wolf—and therefore no wolf at all” (emphasis added). Biletzski’s complex reconstruction of Hobbes’s conception of language requires the human-animal divide to be clear. Since, according to her, animal communication is a-linguistic, she wants to “preserve the status of language as essentially human” together with the “borderline between animal and human.”

Thus, Pettit and Biletzski try to resolve the ambiguities produced by Hobbes’s abrupt conceptual moves of animalization and re-humanization. By keeping the wolf at bay from the realm of humanity they seem to be distilling a clear-cut analytical distinction between worded and non-worded creatures. However, neither juxtaposing logos to wolves, like Biletzki, nor caging the animality of man in a first, non-worded state of nature, like Pettit, accounts for the ambivalences in Hobbes’s theoretical move. If Pettit can distinguish between a non worded (animal) and worded (human?) state of nature, and Biletzki can refer to “talking wolves” it may be because there is ambivalence in Hobbes’s argument that needs to be addressed. Instead of providing an account of this ambivalence Pettit and Biletzki reenact it by deciding on the undecidable in two different but complementary ways: Pettit’s analytical distinction assumes that language extracts us from our community with beasts; Biletzki appropriates animality to logos by describing a state of nature populated by talking wolves that are “no wolf at all.” From a perspective informed by lycanthropy however, it is possible to grasp this ambivalence between human and animal in Hobbes, and this is important because perhaps the wolf-man is gesturing towards a different kind of politics.

A distinct, but ultimately coincidentally humanist position is favored by Quentin Skinner, who reframes Hobbes’s political philosophy within the horizon of ideas of Renaissance Humanism. Skinner’s work has emphasized the importance of the historical context for
understanding texts central to the canon of political theory and questioned the limitations of the notion of liberty put forward by liberalism. In this endeavor he is committed to the rhetorical tradition of Cicero, Quintilian, and Sallust interpreted by him as part of the project of neo-Roman free cities, later taken up by the English republicans. Contrary to a notion of liberty understood as absence of constraints, Skinner finds in this tradition a broader, humanistic understanding of freedom in which “it is only possible to enjoy civil liberty to the full if you live as the citizen of a free state.” This means that, according to Skinner, and contrary to Isaiah Berlin, the possibility to participate in a popular government is central to the experience of freedom. Conversely, the lack of popular institutions enabling such participation can only produce servile and dependent individuals which never fully realized their human potential: they never cease to be slaves.

The contextualist approach proposed by Skinner enables him not only to avoid historical grand narratives but also to offer an important and much needed corrective to once contestable claims about liberty that have sedimented in the last century into nearly natural facts. But contextualist methodology does not allow us to attend to Hobbes’s wolf-man. Historians of the Cambridge School ground their reconstructive approach on the notions of speech-acts and authorial intentionality, and so the question of “the animal” seems irrelevant to the notion of freedom that Skinner otherwise endorses. The political significance of Hobbes’s provocative animalization of the human is overshadowed by Skinner’s aim to relate Hobbes’s project to Renaissance Humanism. If the animalization of the human proposed by Hobbes is not captured by the methodological framework used by Cambridge historians it might be because such methodology harbors a humanist bias. Failing to account for that bias risks re-instating an ostensible effect of Hobbes’s therapeutic intervention: a certain notion of exclusively human politicality. Instead, why not ponder on the idea that Hobbes’s move towards the animal can
help us glimpse a different kind of subjection of which humanism is an effect? In other words, ascribing non-politicality to both animals and to the animality of the human-animal may leave the domination of animality unquestioned, and humanism may depend on just that. This unquestioned domination of animality guarantees that the human can be successfully ontologized.

From an angle of vision in which humanism is a problem and a historical achievement (fraught, contestable) we are alerted to the passages in De Cive where Hobbes discusses the right “we get” over “irrational creatures” in the context of a discussion of human serfdom and slavery (DC: 209). At the end of the chapter VIII Hobbes claims that we get a right over animals in the same way we do “over the persons of men; to wit, by force and natural strength” (209). When Hobbes examines the categories of slavery and serfdom, he conceives them as kinds of “natural government”, namely, as governments by “power and natural force” (205). Thus, human natural government over other humans is conceptually equivalent to human government over non-human animals: men can be lords of other men in the same way as they can be lords of non-human animals. Since Skinner takes from republicanism and humanism the idea that when humans dominate or are dominated they are undermining freedom, he cannot remain inattentive to the fact that insofar as human-animals dominate over non-human animals they are part of a corrupting regime that may undo their liberty. This is not to say that animals have to have a share in government but republicans cannot rely on the human-animal divide to disguise or render invisible those areas of life in which corrupting domination persists even in “free” societies. Thus, humanism instead of standing against the possibility of being de-humanized, and thereby treated like animals or slaves, could be read as the product of the subjection of our own animality to the needs of the civil state. 56 Or, to put it differently, republicanism may be
unable to completely rule out the possibility that humanism is the unstable result of a process of disciplining and taming, instead of the conceptual bedrock of a more expansive notion of freedom.

In contrast to the humanist consensus, Erica Fudge has been studying the instability of the human-animal divide in the culture of Hobbes’s formative years, Elizabethan and Jacobean England.57 Fudge argues that in “the early modern period the description of many vices – heavy drinking, gluttony, lust […]-- were represented as having the power to transform humans into beasts.”58 Through these descriptions, Fudge identifies a “logic in which humans can actually become animals through their actions.”59 Fudge draws on Burton, one of several authors contemporary to Hobbes, and likely familiar to him, who were concerned about how the failure to control passions such as melancholy (but also joy and fear, and bodily reactions such as laughter) was thought capable of unsettling the realm of the human altogether. In the words of Burton, it was important to establish “how a man differs from a dog”.60 The perspective opened by Fudge allows us to see that in late Renaissance and Early Modern England notions such as “dog laughter,”61 “melancholia canina,”62 and “insania lupina”63 were used to describe what was exposed as the unchecked irruption of the animal in the self, producing a grey area of undecidability between human and animal that challenged human superiority not only over other creatures but also over its own animality. In this different context, what new theoretical possibilities might open up if we allow the unstable nature of human nature unveiled by Fudge in relation with melancholy and other passions to become part of Hobbes studies?

4) A Symptomatic Reading of Hobbes
From a perspective informed by Benjamin and Derrida, but also by Fudge, I see figurations of lycanthropy in Hobbes as an invitation to further thought. Instead of conceiving of lycanthropy as a mere psychiatric delusional disorder, I will read it as a symptom generated by the brusque conceptual moves of animalization and re-humanization advanced by Hobbes’s therapeutic political theory. As I have already shown, Hobbes animalizes the human being while asserting that social animals, and the animalistic gregariousness of humans, are not to be termed political. Since the only entry to politicality proper is a covenant that requires speech and understanding, animality is excluded from the realm of politics altogether. In this entrance to a political existence animals and the animality of the human being are left at the doorway of the law. However, instead of waiting by the door, like the character of Kafka’s story Before the Law, the animal will return as a symptom of lycanthropy.

At this point, it can be objected that I am presenting a circular argument. There is lycanthropy at the beginning, in Hobbes’s time when, as Howell argues, “all men are turned wolves” and at the end, in the symptoms of lycanthropy in Hobbes’s own therapeutic intervention as a political theorist. In fact, the circularity of this argument is the argument. This circularity is predicted (or performed) by Derrida when, in his book The Animal that Therefore I am [je suis], he plays with the undecidability of the term “suis”: the French “suis” is, at the same time, the first person singular of the verb “to be” [être] and of the verb “to follow” [suivre]. Thus, the phrase “the animal that therefore I am/follow” is parodying not only Descartes’s form of argumentation in his famous dictum “I doubt therefore I am [je suis],” but also a style of syllogistic reasoning in which the conclusion follows, in a straight line (as a recta ratio) so to say, from the premises. This staged circularity parodies not only the recta ratio of logical reasoning, but also its affinities with the establishment of a reason of state. In Derrida’s
statement, the animal is both what we are and what we follow, in the sense of being after it, hunting it and chasing it down. In the case of Hobbes's political theory, the animal is precisely what we are and what we follow, in the sense of being after it, chasing it and hunting it out from the realm of the political. As we shall see, the circular logic enabled by the melancholic lycanthrope gives room to an alternative logic. This lycology, as Derrida calls it, will prove fruitful for a deconstruction of Hobbes’s version of the establishment of a civil state.64

This circularity also involves two other categories proposed by Derrida: incorporating by devouring (as in the state of nature) and incorporating by voicing, or by the use of words (as in a covenant).65 Whereas devouring signifies the lupine, non-political nature of animality, voicing denotes the *logos* (speech, ratiocination) that makes Leviathan possible. These two forms of incorporation will try unsuccessfully to hunt each other out, to follow each other’s traces until *logos* gets the animal or the animal devours *logos*. But this persecution probes to be an impossible one, because it is not possible to determine who is after what; or what is being followed, or who is what and what is who. An illustrative image for this impossible chase is a wolf-man trying to chase its own tail. This persecution, and the vicious circle it engenders, is bound to oscillate between the *talking wolf* and the talking *wolf*.

a) **Hungry like a Wolf**

One specific symptom of lycanthropy in Hobbes’s political theory is the recurring trope of wolfish voracity. Hobbes recognizes the voraciousness of the wolfish disposition as a real threat and he attempts to keep it at bay from the realm of politics. Hobbes prefers other modulations of the mouth to biting and engulfing, and praises the possibilities opened to man by speech. According to him, speech allows humans to surpass by far “the condition of other animals” (OM: 39). Without speech, Hobbes asserts, “there would be no society among men, no peace, and
consequently no disciplines; but first savagery, then solitude, and for dwelling, caves” (OM: 40). According to Hobbes, language enables man to make covenants and laws and this distances him from an animalistic existence: “[f]or before covenants and laws were drawn up, neither public good nor public evil, was natural among men any more than it was among beasts” (DC: 43).

It is precisely this “liberty of the beasts” that is portrayed vividly by Hobbes in the state of nature. Hobbes’s references to “savages” are often joined with figurations of a chaotic and predatory animalistic existence. Hobbes argues that unlike the harmonious and coordinated labor of ants and bees, humans in the state of nature do not enjoy a stable and long lasting accord. In *The Elements*, Hobbes claims that in the state of nature the pathos of brutish “hostility and war” is such that “nature itself is destroyed, and men kill one another” (EL: 73). In *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, the pathos of beastly life is exemplified by referring to the “fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty” existence led by the “savage people in many places of America” (DC: 118; L: 89). In *The Elements* the example of “savage nations” is that of the “old inhabitants of Germany” (EL: 73). However, one of the most graphic depictions of lupine voracity can be found in the frontispiece of *De Cive*.

*De Cive*’s frontispiece stages dramatically what Richard Ashcraft calls the “politics of wild men” in Hobbes. Its lower right quadrant presents a figure of natural liberty barely dressed with leaves, holding an arch and a longbow. According to Skinner, the figure resembles John White’s watercolors of the life of Native Americans which were used to illustrate Thomas Hariot’s report on the original inhabitants of Virginia. In the background, the frontispiece depicts a group of savages hunting down one of their own kind with clubs and arrows. Further in the back, on the right, two human figures are squatting next to what appears to be a human limb in a trestle, presumably being prepared for eating. In addition, a feline predator is included in the
back of the scene, beyond the fences that surround the village, conveying the general idea that, in the natural condition of man, the only law is to eat or be eaten. To be sure, the lower right quadrant of the frontispiece corresponds to the idea of a war of all against all but this correspondence is built upon the depiction of scenes of predatory behavior in which the options are reduced to hunt or be hunted; eat or be eaten, by other creatures.  

The frontispiece of Leviathan appears to be a direct response to the rule of devouring conveyed in part of the frontispiece of *De Cive*. Whereas the latter portrays the predatory ways of wolfish men, Leviathan’s frontispiece depicts a body politic with recognizable human features which has succeeded in incorporating its subjects wholly, the integrity of their lives and limbs maintained, in a stronger and more encompassing “One Person” or “Artificial Man” (emphasis in the original) (L: 114; 9). As one commentator suggests, however, the scene of the gigantic human kingly figure raising above a city, holding a sword and a scepter, can also be read as a scene of devouring. Norman Jacobson argues that the frontispiece of Leviathan depicts a shocking scene: “[t]he Sovereign has devoured his subjects, has incorporated them into his own being, while they themselves are transfixed, regarding their devourer.” If Jacobson is right, and I think he is, then the contrast between incorporating by devouring and voicing in Hobbes becomes blurred. If Leviathan has wolfed down his subjects the only —crucial— difference between devouring and voicing is that whereas in the state of nature individuals are always-already about to be hunted down, in the body politic they have retained their lives and the integrity of their limbs. But is this really true? Does Leviathan manage to incorporate by devouring without disintegrating its subjects? Who (or what) is Leviathan anyway? 

Even if Leviathan is represented in the frontispiece with recognizable human traits a simple genealogy of this mythical creature can only ratify its beastly lineage. Scholars in the
humanities as well as Hobbes’s commentators have shown the multifarious meanings attached to Leviathan across centuries, from the sea monster of the book of Job and the serpent of Isaiah 27:1 to the seventeenth century associations with a crocodile or a whale. I will not add more figurations to this already protean symbol. However, given the unmistakable animal dimension of Leviathan, and its devouring undertones, how should we think about the fact that Hobbes posits a symbol of animality and devouring as a solution to an equally animalistic and voracious state of nature? The question seems pertinent because the devouring dimension of Leviathan creates problems of its own.

In chapter 29 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes uses the language of eating and digestive disorders to characterize some of the threats to the cohesiveness and strength of a political community – understood as a body politic. For instance, Hobbes frames the problem of the limits of imperial expansion by signaling “the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging Dominion” (L: 230). Furthermore, he not only ascribes “intestine disorder” (221) to the errors of men at instituting a commonwealth but also compares the many corporations in a commonwealth with “lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man” (230). In the same vein, Hobbes compares those who “animated by False Doctrines” dare to question absolute power with “little worms”, or intestinal parasites which, Hobbes clarifies somewhat technically, “Physicians call *Ascarides*” (230). Thus, in the sovereign state, the rule of devouring is only deferred, rather than resolved, since the sickness of the body politic now resides in those individuals and corporations who, like parasites, eat out the body politic from within, weakening the commonwealth with intestine discord. Thus, even if, as I have argued above, Hobbes puts words in our mouths to enter into a political community, as if humans were to say “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing myself…,” the pathologies of
incorporating into a sovereign state are still framed as symptoms of a body politic that devours or is devoured.

Interestingly, Hobbes did not limit the trope of a voracious disposition to Leviathan and the state of nature; he also used it to examine the tension between peoples and monarchs. In the famous Epistle Dedicatory of *De Cive*, for instance, Hobbes argues that it was “the speech […] of the [Roman] public” that “all kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts” (89). However, in the next line Hobbes makes a caveat and assigns a similar disposition to the Roman people itself which, according to Hobbes, was a “beast of prey” as well (89). Hobbes is alluding here to the Roman hunger for conquests and riches which brought “the Africans, the Asiatics, the Macedonians, and the Acheans, with many other despoiled nations, into a specious bondage” (89). Although informed by Roman politics and history, the trope of predatory behavior makes an oblique commentary on the tension between the English people and its monarchy. In these passages, Hobbes is singling out the hunger for conquests of the Roman people in order to temper, or perhaps question, not only the grounds of their anti-monarchic disposition, but also that of his contemporaries. The message seems clear: not only kings are predatory also peoples can be hungry like wolves.

The same trope of a wolfish and predatory disposition is used by Hobbes to address politics among nations. In the same Epistle Hobbes goes on to quote Pontius Telesinus who, after an encounter with the Roman general and dictator Sulla, allegedly cried out to his army that Rome and Sulla were to be razed “for that there would always be wolves and predators of their liberty, unless the forest that lodged them were grubbed up by the roots” (DC: 89). The reference to the judgment by Pontius Telesinus, a commander of the Sammite forces fighting the Romans, prepares the famous argument that follows: “that man to man is a kind of God; and that
man to man is an arrant wolf” (89). Hobbes tells us that the first dictum is true “if we compare citizens amongst themselves,” namely, if we consider the interaction among men who belong to the same political community. Conversely, Hobbes also asserts that “if we compare cities” men will interact by “deceit” and “violence”, the result of which he equates with “brutal rapacity” (89). In this context, Pontius Telesinus’s accusation of the Romans and their leaders as wolves and depredators of liberty seems to refer to the rapacious brutality deployed among nations, which lack a common sovereign and thereby remain in a state of nature.

The trope of wolfish voracity appears also in relation to the specificity of human temporal existence. While Oakeshott argued, in his reading of Hobbes, that animal hunger “is the hunger of the moment,” suggesting that animals are caught in the present, Hobbes mobilizes figurations of wolfish voracity precisely to describe the elongated temporality Oakeshott ascribes to the human alone. In other words, if animals are caught in the moment, or in the immediacy of their bodily appetites, human hunger is oriented towards the future. Humans want to know, or at least to be able to foresee, what will happen to them in the times to come; they are not satiated with present well being but want to know if they will be able to maintain it tomorrow. This enables curiosity, as we saw earlier, but also hunger. In another exploration of the human’s wolfish disposition, Hobbes argues in *De Homine* that “man surpasseth in rapacity and cruelty the wolves, bears, and snakes that are not rapacious unless hungry and not cruel unless provoked, whereas man is famished even by future hunger” (OM: 40). As I shall show in what follows, only a handful of commentators proposed the relationship between the specificity of human future-orientedness and melancholy in Hobbes. None of them, however, advanced an argument on the relationship between melancholy and animality, or about the lycanthropic symptoms exhibited by Hobbes’s political theory.
b) The Melancholic Person

Since Hobbes refers to the melancholic no more than three times in his work (EL: 53; L: 58, 59) the inattentiveness of the commentators is understandable. In this case, however, a simple attachment to literal references may be somewhat inadequate to the matter under consideration. As I argued in the introduction, in Early Modern Europe melancholy was a protean notion with numerous embodiments and figurations, and a subject of wide concern in the English culture of the period. The Italian scholars Gianfranco Borrelli and Mauro Simonazzi are therefore pioneers in charting the implications of Hobbes’s discussion of melancholy for his political theory. Although they focus on a more circumscribed understanding of melancholy (it does not include lycanthropy) their articles are significant contributions to the understanding of the implications of the melancholic condition for Hobbes’s political theory. I will draw on their arguments as they shed light on a crucial aspect of my argument on lycanthropy: the therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s political theory.

Borrelli reads melancholy in Hobbes as an obstacle to obedience and political reason. Hobbes’s political theory, he argues, has to curb and restrain “destructive dynamics” like “the fear of violent death, mental suffering, spiritual malaise.” The therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s political theory is therefore exposed, as mental and spiritual instability can translate into the instability of the body politic as such. An instantiation of this therapeutic concern occurs in Hobbes’s well-known discussion of Prometheus as the prudent man who “looks too far before him in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of death […]; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.” Although Hobbes mentions “anxiety” as the key affective malaise in the prudent man, Borrelli finds an intertextuality between Hobbes and Burton that suggests a link to melancholy. In The Anatomy Burton refers to
Borrelli suggests that the prudent man can be thought of as undergoing melancholy, and holds that this affective or spiritual malaise is an expression of the failure in the “policy of transcendence” put forward by the ecclesiastical powers, which failed to “connect the long-term aims, and above all the security of life and spiritual salvation, with the aims nearest to individual interests.” Thus, Borrelli acknowledges that this heightened religious melancholy can have “anti-political” implications for Hobbes’s project, as the melancholic person resists the establishment of the recta ratio that is to lead individuals away from the state of nature, and into a commonwealth. Borrelli goes as far as to stress the “political value” of “the treatment of madness and of melancholy” as they can have “lacerating effects for the political unity of the State” and to suggest that there is “an internal part of each subject which will never be possible to govern entirely.”

Like Borrelli, Simonazzi also stresses the affinities between Burton and Hobbes. Whereas Burton practices introspection, dissecting his own melancholic tendencies confident that “out of a fellow-feeling” he may help others, Hobbes celebrates introspection as key for the art of government as the ruler “must read in himself, not this, or that particular man, but Man-kind” (L: 11). Out of this introspective perspective Simonazzi focuses on the peculiar trait of Hobbesian human psychology also pinpointed by Borrelli: the projection towards the future. In his reading of Hobbes, Simonazzi asserts that “Man, as opposed to animal, has therefore got a dilated timescale, he doesn’t just live in the present and for the immediate, but he knows the dimensions of past and future.” In other words, whereas animals are stuck in the moment, in the satisfaction of immediate bodily appetites (hunger or lust), human beings need “the dimension of the future […] for the satisfaction of the pleasures of the mind.” Paradoxically,
Simonazzi finds that the melancholy generated by this “dilated timescale” is precisely what distinguishes humans from animals. Simonazzi concludes that melancholy is “an illness specific and exclusive to man.”\(^{81}\)

To be sure, I cannot follow Simonazzi on this point. Although I agree with Borrelli and Simonazzi when they recognize the therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s political theory I depart from their diagnosis, as they fail to see the way in which melancholy is linked to animality. Since neither attends to the symptoms of lycanthropy associated to melancholy in Hobbes they do not ask whether animality is precisely that “part of each subject” that cannot be governed, not at least by the authority delineated by Hobbes’s political theory. Moreover, by failing to attend to the animal, Simonazzi joins the humanist consensus shoring it up even further by taking the sign of the human animal indistinction and treating it as a mark of the human as such. From my perspective, it is ironic to find the grounds of the distinction between human and animal in a dilated timescale that, Hobbes argues, turns humans into creatures more voracious than wolves (OM: 40). In addition, neither Borrelli nor Simonazzi attend to another revealing intertextuality between Hobbes and Burton. Burton describes lycanthropes as persons who “run howling about graves and fields in the night, and will not be persuaded but that they are wolves, or some such beasts,” and introduces the case of a Dutch man who “haunted about graves, and kept in churchyards.”\(^{82}\) When Hobbes himself describes the melancholic person, he asserts that it is characterized by “haunting of solitudes and graves” (L: 54). This is imprudent indeed.

If Hobbes’s melancholic person can be read as a lycanthrope, as a human being on the verge of becoming an animal, then the undecidable nature of human nature has important consequences for Hobbes’s political theory. The melancholic person might not only be resisting the *recta ratio* necessary for entering into the civil state, it might also be gesturing towards
animality to avoid being lured into reasoning like the state. In other words, it is not only that the melancholic’s spiritual malaise produces instability in the Hobbesian body politic, but also that it glimpses the “liberty of the beasts” that the sovereign state negates in order to establish human politicality. But the lycanthrope cannot be reduced to its anarchic, anti-state impulse. It also struggles to reconfigure itself from the aggressive wolf denoted in the dictum “man is a wolf to man” to a more complex, mournful disposition. The melancholic lycanthrope described by Hobbes might undo the aggressive wolf ready to devour others in the state of nature to suggest instead its lamenting and caring counterpart. The lycanthrope that roams and howls at cemeteries might be trying to mourn the death of animality to politics, as a result of the hunting out necessary to achieve an artificial human community. Becoming an animal and roaming cemeteries can be read as the opposite to the affirmation of human politicality through speech to guarantee life and bodily integrity. Hence, the Hobbesian lycanthrope might be suggesting the possibility of an alternative logos, a distinct way of following (logically) and of being followed. This alternative, circular logic, follows logic instead of following logically: it haunts the recta ratio and mourns its casualties. It embodies that part in the human being that is death to Hobbes’s political theory, producing a mournful wolf, instead of a voracious one. If it hungers, it is hungry for something other than food.

c) One More Wolf and a Hunting Dog

The wolf-man is not the only figure of liminality and melancholy in Hobbes. Benjamin notes the affinities between the dog and the melancholic, and indeed Hobbes’s rich animal imagery rewards a turn in that direction. Benjamin reminds us that, according to the physiology of the time, the spleen was considered predominant in the dog, whereas the melancholic person was conceived as suffering an excess of black bile produced by the spleen. Hence, if we find
symptoms of lycanthropy in Hobbes’s description of the predatory disposition in the natural condition, in the interaction among nations, as well as in the relation between peoples and monarchs, other melancholic canine figures are called upon to represent crucial human capacities, such as the faculties of mental discourse and imagination. Ironically, the more Hobbes invests in leaving animal voracity behind by means of *logos* (speech, reason), the more he gets entangled with dogs, in this case with a spaniel.

When Hobbes elaborates on the meaning of regulated mental discourse (or train of thoughts) (L: 20-21) he establishes a distinction between humans and beasts. According to Hobbes, humans and beasts share a regulated train of thought by means of which, given a certain effect, “the causes, or means that produce it” are sought after (21). However, Hobbes holds that what makes human’s mental discourse distinctive is that it “seek[s] all the possible effects” that can be produced by a thing, and imagines the variety of uses that they could have (21). Thus, it is in the context of an elucidation of human mental discourse that a figure of a spaniel, a hunting dog and a royal dog, a dog that had been around kings and philosophical disputations for quite some time, will enter the scene --but not yet.

Hobbes explains that the seeking or “hunting out” (L: 21) of all possible causes or effects of a given phenomenon, characteristic of humans, contrasts with the economy of bodily passions of animals. He argues that the train of thought of animals is regulated only by sensual passions like “hunger, thirst, lust, and anger” (21) and that thereby animals will only seek for causes and effects to the extent that they are concerned with satiating these basic set of passions. On the contrary, Hobbes describes humans as possessing a passion that is “hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has not other Passion but sensuall” (21). Hobbes also holds that basic appetites for food and other sensual pleasures tend to “take away the care of knowing causes” or
at least to exhaust them, and that human curiosity is distinctive due to the “perseverance of
delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge” (42). Hobbes refers to this
qualitatively different passion exclusive to humans as “curiosity” or “lust of the mind” (21; 42).

As an oxymoronic combination of lust and mind, dullness and reason, basic appetites and
ratiotination, the notion of "lust of the mind" approaches the symptoms of lycanthropy that
Hobbes addresses but also reenacts. Thus, I propose to think of Hobbes’s “lust of the mind” as
another symptom of lycanthropy, namely, as a peculiar kind of “human” voracity: a hunger for
knowledge. This hunger or appetite seeks to exhaust the effects of a given cause and investigate
its applications beyond the imperatives of subsistence and immediate bodily satisfaction. This
hunger therefore marks a surplus in the human, an overzealous “seeking” or “hunting out” that is
not caught up in the moment and exceeds bodily needs to provide for an insatiable type of
appetite. In other words, humans show a voracity of a different kind, of an intensity that is
foreign to animals, or so it seems. However, if human beings become insatiably voracious when
hunting out for causes and effects, they seem to become hunting dogs when looking into the past.

Hobbes dwells on the workings of the human mind when it remembers or recalls passed
actions or events. He had already established that humans and animals share the “train of
regulated thoughts” that seeks “the causes or means that produce” a certain imagined effect (L:
21). He then goes on to argue that this regulated thinking is no other than “seeking” and calls it
“Invention”, “Sagacitas” and “Solertia” (21). By calling this basic regulated thinking sagacitas,
Hobbes is stepping into a distinction which had already been invoked in a famous disputation
concerning dogs that included King James, a monarch very fond of these creatures. James I
visited Cambridge in March 1615 and witnessed a disputation, or a mock debate, between two
scholars on whether dogs could make a syllogism.84 During the debate, John Preston, the
defender of the logical dog position, argued that dogs organized their thoughts in propositions. Based on hound’s behavior in hunting expeditions the scholar argued as follows in favor of the logical dog: “The hare is gone either this way or that way; smells out the minor with his nose, namely, She is not gone that way; and follows the conclusion, Ergo this way, with open mouth” (emphasis in the original). To this argument the scholar defending the position against logical dogs replied that they possess sagacity but not sapience regarding preys, and that they are nasutuli (from nasus, nose, but also acute and sagacious) but not logici. Thus, the distinction was made between sagacitas and logos, between the capacity to trace a scent according to the needs of the belly and the ability to organize the train of thoughts logically, as in a syllogism. When King James’s voice was heard, he recalled his own experiences with hunting dogs and pronounced himself in favor of the logical dog.

This peculiar debate at Cambridge on the limits of animal reason also stages the reason of state at work. The moderator of the debate was quick to concede that the king’s dogs were exceptionally intelligent due to the king’s “illustrious influence”. But, what would be Hobbes’s position on this subject? It may seem that, thirty-six years after the debate, Hobbes contradicts King James’s judgment on the logical dog by calling the seeking or hunting out of the causes and effects, shared by humans and beasts, sagacitas (L: 21). According to Hobbes, the dog is sagacious, and therefore has a regulated train of thoughts, but it cannot think in “Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech” (19). In other words, dogs only have limited access to speech: they respond to the call of their master but they cannot discern a logical contradiction (19). Despite this assessment of the limits of dog’s intelligence, Hobbes will ultimately bring the dog back to logos, though in this case the canine will be tamed to act as a figuration of the laborious mental discourse of man by means of an analogy. If King James’s dogs collaborated
with their intelligence in the royal performance of hunting, the Hobbesian spaniel will play as a metaphorical aid in the hunting out and retrieval of past thoughts and actions.

Hobbes’s argument proceeds by calling our attention to the action of Remembrance or Reminiscentia, in relation to the hypothetical case in which “a man seeks what he hath lost” and his mind rushes back to remember the circumstances in which he could have missed it (L: 21). Hobbes does not give us traces of what kind of thing or object man is after in this case, but he tells us what happens in man’s mind in its effort to retrieve it. Hobbes explains that a man’s mind “runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it” (21-22). Hobbes proceeds by explaining that occasionally the hunting out of the causes of this loss object is not totally blind because “a man knows a place determinate […] whereof he is to seek” (22). Hobbes provides us with three images to illustrate this circumscribed search: it occurs “as one would sweep a room to find a jewel”; “as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime” and “as a spaniel that ranges a field, till he finds a scent” (22). I suggest that the use of a spaniel as a metaphor for the working of human’s memory and imagination is quite suggestive.

This spaniel remains caught in a difficult position in the argument. On the one hand, according to his description, the spaniel, as a beast, lacks passions other than sensual, and is therefore hindered from exhausting “all the possible effects” that can be produced by a cause. On the other, also as a beast, it shares with humans the train of regulated thoughts referred as sagacitas and is therefore capable of seeking out the causes of an event. When Hobbes explains this sub-type of Remembrance, or circumscribed search, he commences his argument with expressions such as “sometimes a man seeks…” and “sometimes a man knows a place […] whereof he is to seek” (L: 22). These expressions make clear that Hobbes is thinking about the workings of the human mind and the metaphor of the spaniel will be used in this context. In
other words, when a man is trying to remember or calling to mind the circumstances that caused this or that object to be lost, he does it “in the same manner as a Spaniel ranges a field” (22).

It is worth noticing that this metaphor only works one way. A spaniel ranging the field to catch a scent is not acting like a human when he is remembering or calling to mind former thoughts or actions. Even if these two “actions”, remembrance and the spaniel catching a scent, could be included conceptually in what Hobbes calls sagacitas, and remain at the level of what is shared by humans and beasts, the conceptual horizontality does not grant metaphorical reciprocity. Hobbes cannot say that spaniels catch a scent in the same way that men search and retrieve thoughts, actions and events in their minds. Only the spaniel is captured in the analogy, not man. This capturing is problematic precisely because of man’s distinctive and indefatigable hunger for knowledge, which is established by Hobbes a few lines before. Derrida warn us that analogy “is always reason, logos, reasoning, or calculation” [my translation]. In this particular case, the analogy captures the spaniel for the mental discourse of “man”; the spaniel illuminates the workings of the human mind adding eloquence to Hobbes’s argument. However, if a spaniel is included by analogy into the workings of the human mind it will always remain an illogical dog, a dog that “man” has captured and domesticated to talk about his own mental discourse or logos, never a dog that interrupts its captivity to question the grounds of human’s distinctive mental discursive logic. In sum, it is a dog which has been captured to satisfy human’s hunger for knowledge, human’s peculiar kind of predatory behavior.

According to commentators like Karl Josef Höltgen, spaniels were often used by late Renaissance and early modern thinkers to convey the logic and properties of the human mind “that search out and ‘retrieve’ ideas” such as reason, imagination and memory. Höltgen argues that similar spaniels can be found in authors like Juan Huarte, Burton and, after Hobbes, John
Dryden. In the context of a discussion of oratory qualities, Huarte argues in his book *Examen de ingenios para las ciencias* (Examination of Men’s Wits, 1575) that a good orator has to possess high imagination, like a hunting dog that searches for the game and brings it to hand. Burton compares himself to a spaniel to illustrate both his writing style and his voracity for knowledge; he writes about his “running wit”, his “unconstant, unsettled mind” which “like a ranging spaniel […] barks at every bird he sees, leaving his game.”⁸⁹ After Hobbes’s reference, Dryden continues the series: “wit in the poet, or Wit writing […] is no other than the faculty of imagination in the writer, which, like a nimble spaniel, beats over and ranges through the field of memory.”⁹⁰ Benjamin adds up to the series when he quotes Karl Giehlow’s reference to the Italian humanist Piero Valeriano who refers to the melancholic dog as the best retriever: the “dog which ‘faciem melancholicam prae se ferat’ [bears a melancholic face] would be the best at tracking and running.”⁹¹ Contrary to Dryden’s spaniel, further melancholic dogs discussed by Hobbes will lose their wits and become mad (rabid) in their attempt to retrieve memories of an Ancient freedom allegedly taken away from them.

d) Saturn and Mad Dogs

Like Hobbes, Huarte, Burton and Dryden, Benjamin also hints at the relationship between dogs and wit, imagination or knowledge. In his book on the German *Trauerspiel*, written in 1925, and in a context of an investigation of Renaissance and early modern melancholy, Benjamin gives an account of dogs as figurations of “the tireless investigator and thinker.”⁹² Benjamin suggests that, in this period, the “contemplative impulses” typical of the melancholic are to be found “no less in the gaze of a dog than in the attitude of a pensive genius.”⁹³ In addition to this affinity between scholarly genius and dogs, Benjamin detects a link between princes and melancholy. According to him “[t]he melancholic prince is the paradigm of the melancholic man”⁹⁴ because
the gravitas of his political persona contrasts with the vulnerability of his creaturely life. In this context, Benjamin quotes a phrase by Aegidius Albertinus, a German catholic writer of the Counterreformation, who refers to the prince as “someone who has been bitten by a mad dog: he experiences terrifying dreams and is afraid for no good reason.”95 Thus, two of the main traits of princely melancholy identified by Benjamin are terrifying dreams, which can also be divinatory and prophetic, and phobia or causeless fears.96 These symptoms fit nicely with the story of Cronos-Saturn, the king of the Golden Age also discussed by Benjamin.

Benjamin refers to Cronos, the mythical king of the Golden Age, to show that the paradisiacal state of creation is also roamed by a fearful and voracious sovereign. According to the myth, Cronos, the son of Gaia and Uranus, led a rebellion of the Titans against the rule of his father. As a result, Uranus was dethroned and emasculated by Cronos. Afterwards, haunted by a prophecy that foretold his own dethroning in the hands of one of his children, Cronos devoured his progeny as they were born.97 The famous painting by Goya, *Saturn Devouring His Son* portrays the deranged king tearing apart with his very mouth the small body of a child. Thus, Benjamin’s commentary on the “Cronos-concept,”98—as he distinctively puts it—includes the fearful and the ferocious, the melancholic disposition and the wolf. Saturn acted as if he was bitten by a mad dog. His fear of losing power made him lose control of himself, and turned him into a voracious ruler.

Interestingly, Saturn (DC: 97) and mad dogs (L: 226) are not foreign to Hobbes’s intellectual concerns. Hobbes mentions the myth of Saturn in the context of a discussion of doctrines that justify “that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death” (DC: 96-97). Hobbes wants to correct this early modern, anti-monarchical, reading of ancient writers arguing that “they [ancients] reverenced the supreme power […] Therefore they little used, as in our days, to
join themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits, to the utter ruin of the state” (97). The figure of Saturn is introduced in this context as an example of the way in which the ancients “chose to have the science of justice wrapped up in fables” (97). Hobbes writes:

Wherefore it was peace and a golden age, which ended not before that, Saturn being expelled, it was taught lawful to take up arms against kings (97)

Unlike Saturn, who devoured his children to remain in power, Hobbes wants to keep voraciousness at bay, in the natural condition, to favor another type of incorporation that can secure humanity politically. However, when he attempts to ground public authority he mobilizes ancient fables that betray the lycanthropic tendencies of his enterprise. The fable of Saturn is also the saturnine fable of the demise of sovereignty, of a sovereign that chooses to devour its children out of fear of being dethroned by them. To put it differently, Hobbes draws on Saturn to justify political authority in his time, but when he does it he mobilizes images of devouring that reenact, instead of working through, the symptoms of lycanthropy. However, instead of acknowledging the voracious and melancholic political authority implied in the legend of Saturn, Hobbes chooses to criticize the melancholic dog-thinkers identified by Benjamin.

Hobbes argues that certain thinkers, influenced by Greek and Latin writers, spread out the opinion that “the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves” (L: 226). By doing so, they postulate as lawful to kill a king, though “they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant” (226). Hobbes thinks therapeutically and compares the pernicious effects of “democraticall writers” (226) with “venim” transmitted by “the biting of a mad Dogge” whose effects work in man as if it “endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge” (226). Like Howell, who wrote that England during the civil war could be called “the Isle of Dogs,” and like Burton, who was concerned about the necessity of establishing the difference between a man and a dog, Hobbes finds in the
democratic “mad dogs” a threat to his project of humanization of the political realm. Since democratic writers indulge themselves in the melancholic yearning of a liberty long lost, these deceitful creatures are dogs in human’s clothing, and risk poisoning the lives of other humans -- turning them into mad dogs as well. When dogs become rabid they are aggressive and uncontrollable, as the disease severs their complicity with humans forged after years of co-evolution leading to domestication. If men are mad dogs to other men the horizon of a widespread wolfish voracity becomes too pressing a possibility. If left untouched by Hobbes’s humanitarian intervention, anarchy and wolfish voracity would reign undisputed.

Hobbes’s brief foray into hydrophobic politics can be linked back to Burton’s discussion of the same disease. Burton examines the symptoms of hydrophobia right after dealing with lycanthropy. Hydrophobia, Burton tells us, can also produce lycanthropic effects since the syndrome includes barking and howling: hydrophobic men act as if they have been turned into dogs or wolves. At this point, the metamorphic spasms of creaturely life taking shape under Hobbes’s argument are somewhat difficult to discern and follow. But through that difficulty, we see Hobbes’s political theory in the fascinating ambiguity of its therapeutic intervention: it stands both as the antidote and the poison; it fights the lycanthropic symptoms and reenacts them; it strives for a political humanization and produces multifarious symptoms of lycanthropy. Hobbes’s argument, however, transitions from hydrophobia to tyrannophobia:

So when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarl at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre (L: 226).

In fact, these men/dogs or dogs/men, these werewolves, are afraid of being enslaved by a monarchy. In other words, according to Hobbes, a subject under a monarchy is not a slave because “he is not hindered to doe what he has a will to do” (L: 146): subjects of a monarch are
not chained. However, out of the fear of being enslaved men act as if they were mad dogs, growling and biting at a tyrant that, according to Hobbes, does not actually exist. Hobbes himself brings up the notion of “causeless fears” (54) to characterize the melancholic disposition. The problem then again is melancholy. Thus, Hobbes seems to suggest that this condition blinds people’s intellects to his argument that it is convenient for everybody to incorporate under a sovereign authority to preserve the integrity of their lives and limbs: if melancholy brings up fears that have no cause it resists the clear-cut imputation of causes implied in the “continuall fear, and danger, of violent death” (89). Writers who stir these lycanthropic tendencies instead of appeasing them complicate the difference between humans and animals to the point of undermining the process of political humanization proposed by Hobbes. Hence, it might be pertinent to ask whether Hobbes is suggesting that we should think of democratic writers as spaniels that go rabid and, instead of aiding the monarch in the display of its royal splendor, or “man” as a figuration of his mental discourse, snarl at them; reversing the chase and threatening to hunt them down. It seems that, according to Hobbes, even dogs should regain composure instead of going mad or melancholic.

Conclusion

In this paper I attempted to highlight the therapeutic dimension of Hobbes’s political theory. I argued that his work can be productively read along with other efforts to address and contain troubled consciousnesses in a time of political and religious turmoil. I sustained that Hobbes acknowledges the lycanthropic tendencies of his time and performs his political theory as a kind of therapy: He animalizes the human being in the state of nature, qualifies this form of animalistic existence as non-political and proceeds to grant entry to politicality only through the humanizing devices of reason and discourse. I therefore took issue with the humanist consensus
in Hobbes’s scholarship as it only perceives his move towards securing the political within the human citadel, and disregards its condition of possibility: a prior animalization of the human being. Finally, I attempted to shed light on several instantiations of the lycanthropic symptom brought about by the death of animality to politics in his political theory.

I found that Hobbes’s therapeutic intervention harbors the ambiguities of a Derridian *pharmakon*: it is both remedy and poison for the health of a body politic. Through Burton and Howell, but also through the contemporary work by Fudge, I showed several voices that draw on the wolfish humors of lycanthropy to conceptualize the political and spiritual malaises of Early Modern England. I suggested that Hobbes attempts to treat those humors but that his abrupt shock therapy generates problems of its own. Margaret Cavendish, a philosopher, poet, political writer and Hobbes’s acquaintance captured these problems when she imagined how a Hobbesian world would look like: “when all the parts of this imaginary world came to press and drive each other, they seemed like a company of wolves that worry sheep, or like so many dogs that hunt after hares.” Thus, the proliferation of symptoms of lycanthropy in Hobbes’s arguments, under the guise of wolfish voracity, dogs, mad dogs, Saturn, and the melancholic person, among others, indicate side effects, reactions and returns; all consequences of his defiant re-drawing of the human-animal divide in a way that ironically has come to stick as ontologized humanism. Through this re-drawing, Hobbes’s political theory aims at helping us regain composure at the price of chasing animality away from the realm of politics. But this impossible chase establishes the peculiar circularity of sovereignty that Derrida calls lycology: the impossible yet recurring chase of wolf and man reflected in the mournful undecidability of the lycanthrope, which howls and roams the cemeteries reminding us of the death of animality to the political.
Hobbes’s lycanthrope, and its mournful disposition, has never been totally reabsorbed by humanizing narratives of the political, and therefore resurfaces in the works of critics of these narratives such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin and Gilles Deleuze. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche introduces the figure of the wolf (and the lion) in a more assertive vein to refer to the free spirit and truth-seeker which escapes herd morality and does not give in to the “happiness of slaves”. Happiness is precisely what was negated to Sergei Pankejeff, the depressed patient in Freud’s famous case of infantile neuroses commonly referred as “The Wolf-Man”. His dream of being stared at by wolves is interpreted by Freud as the result of witnessing a primal scene in which his parents have sex *a tergo* (from behind). Deleuze and Guattari take issue with Freud’s (oedipal) taming of the wolf-man’s case by reversing his dream of being watched by wolves into a scene in which he witnesses his parents having sex *more ferarum* (like the beasts). According to Deleuze and Guattari, what was at stake in Sergei’s dream was more than the oedipal primal scene: it was the “call to become-wolf”.

Benjamin acknowledges this call and situates the werewolf outside the forest, and into the anonymous and crowded urban landscape of modern cities—in this case, Berlin. According to him, the *flâneur* can assume “the features of the werewolf at large in the social jungle—the creature to whom Poe was given the definitive description in his story ‘The Man of the Crowd’”. Again, the notion of a constant yet impossible persecution of wolf and man is here signaled by the futile pursue of the man of the crowd in Edgar Allan Poe’s famous story.

But focusing on the melancholic lycanthrope is important for other reasons as well: it fills a gap in the contemporary reception of Hobbes. Whereas the vainglorious and the fool are receiving sustained scholarly attention, equally Hobbesian characters like the melancholic have been utterly neglected. Together with vainglory, however, melancholy lays out the bipolar
structure of Hobbesian subjectivity, and since the glory seeking individual cannot always get what he wants he will be prone to melancholy. Moreover, Borrelli seems to suggest that folly and melancholy go together in Hobbes, and hence an account of the saturnine disposition might also shed light on Hobbes’s fool. Recent polemics on Hobbes’s fool, namely, on the person who holds that covenants can sometimes be reasonably broken, center on whether the fool is a silent or an explicit one. I wonder whether the focus of this discussion cannot be related to the lycanthrope’s undecidability between devouring (animal) and voicing (human). To put it differently: is the fool a talking wolf or a talking wolf? As an avenue for future research, it could be useful to rule out the possibility that the fool is not yet another symptom of lycanthropy, namely, of the pull towards becoming an animal to remain outside of the realm of the political as covenant. In this context, the fool might be thought according to John Donne’s poem that reads as follows: “Man is a lump, where all beasts kneaded be/Wisdom makes him an ark where all agree/The fool, in whom these beasts do live at jar […] is himself their prey/All which was man in him, is eat away.” Donne’s fool is a human who has been hunted down and devoured by the beasts within. If the fool’s entire human condition is at risk, how can he be expected to honor a covenant that he cannot conceive? The fact that Hobbes resorts to the story of Saturn overthrown by Jupiter to make a case against the fool’s “Successful wickednesse” (L: 101) shouldn’t at least intrigue commentators?

Indeed, there seems to be something beastly, untameable, about resisting being part of a commonwealth and a passage from De Cive points at this. In the process of discussing three possibilities of leaving the commonwealth and returning to the natural condition (rejection; commonwealth falls under the power of the enemy and lack of successor) Hobbes writes “And by these three ways, all subjects are restored from their civil subjection to that liberty which all
men have to all things; to wit, natural and savage; for the natural state hath the same proportion to the civil (I mean, liberty to subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man” (DC: 204). There are four oppositions here, they are: natural state v. civil state; liberty v. subjection; passion v. reason; and beast v. man. From my perspective, what is revealing in this passage is not just the relation of proportionality assigned to the four sets of oppositions, but the assumption that the notions which comprised them are comparable. Thus, I take Hobbes to be pointing to a certain elective affinity in the tension among these polarities. Once Hobbes suggests a resemblance between these notions any unchecked irruption of the beast in man resembles the re-emergence of the natural condition in the civil state, the emergence of liberty in subjection, and the emergence of the passions in reason. The elective affinities between these notions seem to map up into my argument on lycanthropy.

If we read Hobbes’s argument through the perspective proposed here, the melancholic lycanthrope indicates that passions have taken over reason, and that the eruption of the beast in man interrupts humanity. If both reason and humanity are called into question by melancholy it might not be far-fetched to assume that the other two remaining resemblances, subjection and the civil state, might also be affected by this condition. Consequently, the animality of the human being is not only difficult to be governed but might be ungovernable as such. Borrelli might be alluding to this beast within when he refers to “an internal part of each subject which will never be possible to govern entirely.”108 This same idea seems to be behind Yves-Charles Zarka’s characterization of the melancholic in Hobbes as anti-political.109 However, having traced the complexity and plurality of instantiations of melancholy in Hobbes I would like to avoid assimilating the lycanthrope to mere anarchy or lack of government.
According to my reading, the melancholic lycanthrope in Hobbes can only be conceived as anti-political if we accept the identification of humanity and politicality in the terms proposed by a humanist reading of Hobbes. But perhaps the lycanthrope is displaying resources with the potential of producing other forms of politicality that have been misinterpreted as “anti” and “non” political. By complicating and interrupting the logic of Leviathan, the melancholic questions *logos* and undermines the establishment of modern political reason. It reminds us, stubbornly, that incorporating by means of *logos* has to sacrifice other ways of incorporating which, when negated, will recur with more violence and a voracity that is indefatigable. It is in this context that the recurrence of the figure of a wolfish voracity in Hobbes’s argument should be understood.

In fact, the lycanthropic tendencies in Hobbes’s sovereignty may be gesturing towards other forms of politicality that the author of Malmesbury is helping us see, so to say, *via negativa*. The lycanthrope turns into an animal because it resists renouncing the immediacy of bodily appetites, its natural lust and other articulations of the mouth, like biting and devouring. By anchoring itself in the present, and resisting the dilated timescale that project humans into the future, it might be denouncing the state’s attempt to replace the religious politics of transcendence with the politics of survival. If, in the future, we are all dead, the anxiety of future-orientedness should be relaxed rather than heightened, animalized rather than humanized. Moreover, the lycanthrope may be trying to attune us to fears that have no cause, and which are therefore resistant to its causal reorganization towards fear-of-the-other. The lycanthrope’s howl may be indicating the animal dimension of sound instead of the human realm of meaning; embodied vocality instead of rational speech; a political body instead of a body politic. This
howl can also be mournful, the representation of an anxious masculinity that cannot allow itself to cry, keen, or lament, and needs to turn into animal to do so.

*Homo homini lupus* might in fact mean the contrary of what years of reception made us believe. It may mean that the melancholic is at the verge of becoming an animal to recuperate a part of itself that was lost, or interrupted, by the subjection imposed by reason, man, and the civil state.


2 Professor Quentin Skinner, the leading figure of the Cambridge School, maintains an ambiguous relationship with Derrida’s “postmodernism.” On the one hand, Skinner contends that Derrida’s emphasis on the lack of authorial control of the meaning of a text probes inadequate for a context-sensitive historical reconstruction of political thought. On the other, Skinner underlines certain positive, even liberating, effects of deconstruction: “it seems to me that his [Derrida’s] characteristic stress on ambiguity and lack of authorial control – which it has become the hallmark of post-modern cultural criticism to emphasize – has been a liberating force in the interpretative disciplines […] The deconstructive moment may have passed, but on the whole its legacy seems to me to have been one of enrichment” (650). In this paper I try to regain deconstructive momentum so as to further its potentiality for enrichment. The question of the animal as conceived by the late Derrida may still harbor a liberating force applicable to a symptomatic reading of Hobbes’s political theory. Quentin Skinner “Is it still possible to interpret texts?” *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis* Vol. 89 Issue 3 (2008). Another sympathetic, although brief, allusion to Derrida by Skinner can be found in: *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14.


7 For a reconstruction of a theological understanding of lycanthropy (with emphasis in the French context) see: Nicole-Jacques Lefèvre, “Such and Impure, Cruel and Savage Beast… Images of the Werewolf in Demonological Works” in Werewolves, Witches and Wandering Spirits: Traditional Beliefs & Folklore in Early Modern Europe, Kathryn A. Edwards (editor), (Kirksville MI: Truman State U. Press, 2002), 181-198. For two examples of approaches to lycanthropy as a mental illness see King James, op. cit. and Robert Burton, op. cit.

8 See for instance Harris’s insights about the particular ways in which Hobbes engages in the organic analogy to think the civil state as a body politic. Jonathan Hill Harris, Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U. Press, 1998), 141-143.

9 James Howell, “Letter LVIII, December 1, 1644” in Epistolæ Ho-Elianæ: The familiar letters of James Howell, Volume II, Introduction by Agnes Repplier, edited by James Howell (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1907), 115. In another letter, of 1647, Howell continues to use the figure of the lycanthrope to make sense of the English Civil War: “A bellowing kind of immanity never raged so among men, insomuch that the whole country might have taken its appellation from the smallest part thereof and be called the Isle of Dogs, for all humanity, common honesty, and that mansuetude, with other moral civilities which should distinguish the rational creature from other animals, have been lost here a good while. Nay, besides this cynical, there is a kind of wolfish humour hath seized upon most of this people, a true lycanthropy, they so worry and seek to devour one another; so that the wild Arab and the fiercest Tartar may be called civil men in comparison of us…”(358).


16 Robert Yarrow, Sovereigne Comforts for a Troubled Conscience (1619).

17 Burton, op. cit. 18.


19 Benjamin argues that “in the ruler [Herrscher], the supreme creature, the animal [Tier] can re-emerge with unsuspected power” [translation modified] (86) Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 2003).

20 Benjamin, op. cit. 144, 150 and 152.

The book was written under the assumption that bees had a coherent form of political organization that resembled a monarchy under the rule of a queen bee. See: Charles II's personal bee-keeper, wrote a book on bees that includes praises to the divine right of kings. See Moses Rusden, A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie (London, 1670), 126 and 125.


Bramhall, op. cit. 95.

Bramhall, op. cit. 593.

William Lucy, Observations, Censures and Confutations of notorious errors in Mr. Hobbes His Leviathan, and his other booke (London, 1663), 142.


Adams, “Lycanthropy; or The Wolf Worrying the Lambs”, 123.

Ibid. 113.


“Social creatures [political animals] are such as have some one common object in view; and this property is not common to all creatures that are gregarious. Such social creatures are man, the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane.” (1.1. 488a9 - 488a10). Although the revised Oxford translation of Aristotle’s History of Animals renders politikon zoon as “social creatures” there is consensus among Aristotle scholars that the best translation is “political animals.” Thus, in the History of Animals Aristotle uses an expansive, zoological, understanding of politicality that includes humans alongside with ants and bees, among other animals. See: Aristotle, “History of Animals” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Volume 1), edited by Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series LXXI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 776. See also: David J. Depew, “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s ‘History of Animals’” Phronesis Vol. 40 No. 2 (1995): 156-181.

The non politicality of bees was far from obvious to Hobbes’s contemporaries. The book Feminine Monarchie, by the bee-keeper Charles Butler, was published in 1609 and became very popular among English readers reaching three editions (1609, 1623 and 1634) during Hobbes’s life. The book was written under the assumption that bees had a coherent form of political organization that resembled a monarchy under the rule of a queen bee. See: Charles Butler, The Feminine Monarchie or a Treatise Concerning Bess and the Dye Ordering of Them (Oxford: 1609). Commentators also single out the increasing interest in bees during the restoration. For instance, Moses Rusden, Charles II’s personal bee-keeper, wrote a book on bees that includes praises to the divine right of kings. See Moses Rusden, A further discovery of bees: treating of the nature, government, generation & preservation of the bee (London, 1679).


humanitarian cause (Red Cross or UN relief funds for those in need) many would prioritize the well-being of the dog. See: Keenan Ferguson, “I ♥ my Dog” in Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2004): 374-395.

43 Oakeshott, op. cit. 85.
44 Pettit, op. cit. 25.
47 Ibid. 99.
48 “Was the wolf-man of the state of nature endowed with language? If not, what was the prelinguistic state like? […] A first, popular and almost automatic answer depicts the following scenario as true to the state of nature. Man to man is a wolf – but a talking wolf” (117). Despite his rhetorical hospitality to forms of life that oscillate between humanity and animality, in the end Biletzki’s argument proposes a pragmatic conception of language that also permeates the state of nature and leaves no room for wolves. See: Anat Biletzki, Talking Wolves: Thomas Hobbes on the Language of Politics and the Politics of Language (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
49 Biletzki, op. cit. 135.
50 Ibid. 182.
53 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, op. cit. 68.
54 Ibid. 37, 66 and 91.
55 Moreover, insofar as the contextualist reliance on the speech-act theory reinstates the centrality of language and intentionality in politics, this approach may be collaborating – even if obliquely -- with a humanist bias that is methodologically de-sensitized to the subordination of non-human animals. For instance, Gary Steiner argues that “the human capacity for language is decisive in excluding animals from the sphere of right” (157). Gary Steiner, Anthropocentrism: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2005). For historically inflected approaches to Hobbes’s political theory that dwell on the animalization of the human being see: Richard Ashcraft, “Hobbes’s Natural Man” op. cit. and Mintz, op. cit. 55, 56, 57, 97, 130, 135, 139, 140 and 145.
56 Pettit seems to be aware of the humanist bias in the republican understanding of freedom and makes gestures to correct it. He argues that “while republicanism, like all other mainline political philosophies, is decisively anthropocentric, it gives us salient reasons why we should be concerned about other species” (137). However, this concern is not framed neatly within the theoretical vocabulary forged by the republican understanding of freedom as non-domination. Rather, this concern is assumed on the grounds of our “co-naturality” and shared physical vulnerability with other species, as well as with the loose embrace of the “environmental cause” (137-138). See: Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
59 Fudge, “How a Man Differs from a Dog,” op. cit.
60 Burton, op. cit. 147.
62 Babb and Hefferman hold that the notion of melancholia canina can already be found in the work of the late fifth and early sixth century medical compiler Aetius of Amida in his work De Melancholia ex Galeno, Rufo, Posidonio, et Marcello, Sicarmii Aetii Libellus. However, the original term can be traced back to Marcellus in the fourth century A.D. See: Lawrence Baab, The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580-1642 (Michigan: Michigan State University, [1951] 1965), 44. Carol Falvo Hefferman, “That Dog Again: ‘Melancholia Canina’ and Chaucer’s ‘Book of the Duchess,’” Modern Philology Vol. 84 No 2, (Nov. 1986): 187.
Benjamin also calls attention towards the figure of the dog in Albrecht Dürer’s famous painting *Melencholia I*. See Benjamin, op. cit. 152.

62 Burton, op. cit. 141.


65 Derrida, *Séminaire: La bête…*, op. cit. 100.


68 It is worth noticing that, in contrast with the “eat or be eaten” landscape depicted on the lower right quadrant, the lower left quadrant of the frontispiece shows the peaceful coexistence implied in human agriculture. As Pagden has pointed out, agriculture was often brought about by XVI century Spanish theologians in their debates about whether Native Americans were fully human. Agriculture was one of the defining features of a civilized “human” community, together with the embrace of Christianity. See Pagden, op. cit. 91 and 142.


71 For assessments of the ubiquitous presence of melancholy in the English Early Modern period see: Baab, op. cit.; Trevor, op. cit.; Gowland, op. cit.


73 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, op. cit. 76.

74 Burton, op. cit. 434.

75 Borrelli, op. cit. 92.

76 Borrelli, op. cit. 95.

77 Ibid. 96.


79 Simonazzi, op. cit. 46.

80 Ibid. 46.

81 Ibid. 40.

82 Burton, op. cit. 141.

83 Benjamin, op. cit. 152.


http://www.archive.org/stream/lifeofrenowneddo00ballrich/lifeofrenowneddo00ballrich_djvu.txt.

85 Mayor, op. cit. 94.

86 This is suggestive, although not at all surprising to someone like Derrida who presupposes a “mutual fascination” and a “narcissistic resemblance” between sovereign and beast. See: Derrida, *Séminaire: La bête…*, op. cit. 59.

87 Derrida, *Séminaire: La bête…*, op. cit. 34.

88 Höltingen, op. cit. 1.

89 Burton, op. cit. 17.


91 Karl Giehlow in Benjamin, op. cit. 152.
92 Benjmain, op. cit. 152.
93 Ibid. 146.
94 Ibid. 142.
95 Ibid. 144.
96 Ibid. 148 and 152.
98 Benjamin, op. cit. 150.
99 Burton, op. cit. 142.
102 “But the free spirit […] the non adorer who dwells in the woods, is as hateful to the people as a wolf to dogs. To hound him out of his lair –that is what people have ever called ‘a sense of decency’; and against him the people still set their fiercest dogs” (214-215). “Hungry, violent, godless: thus the lion-will wants itself. Free form the happiness of slaves, redeemed from gods and adorations, fearless and fear-inspiring, great and lonely: such is the will of the truthful” (215). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1982).
104 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (London: Continuum, 2004), 32. From a different perspective, the historian Carlo Ginzburg otherwise coincides with Deleuze and Guattari on this issue. Ginzburg argues that Freud overlooks the background of folk tales available to Russian upper-middle class families like Penkejeff’s and therefore misses the complex cultural milieu operating in the wolf-man’s case, and which induces a dream “of an initiatory character” (148). According to Ginzburg “[s]ubjected to opposing cultural pressures (the nurse, the English governess, his parents and teachers) the wolf-man’s fate differed from what it might have been two or three centuries earlier. Instead of turning into a werewolf, he became a neurotic on the brink of psychosis” (148). Carlo Ginzburg, “Freud, the Wolf-Man and the Werewolves” in *Clues, Myth, and the Historical Method* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
108 Borrelli, op. cit. 96.