Colleen Honigsberg is the Postdoctoral Fellow in Empirical Study of Corporate Governance at the Millstein Center.
Colleen Honigsberg will be an Assistant Professor of Law at Stanford Law School beginning in September 2016. At present, she is the Postdoctoral Fellow in Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School and a Ph.D. Candidate in Accounting at Columbia Business School. Colleen’s research is focused on empirical study of corporate governance and regulation of investment funds. Before beginning her Ph.D. studies, she received her J.D. from Columbia Law School. Colleen also worked as a Certified Public Accountant for PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory Services and for Compass Lexecon.
Colleen’s research examines new sources of data and applies them to empirical analysis of corporate law. Her recent papers have examined the role creditors play in investment policy, the structure of executive compensation, and the bundling of proxy proposals. She has also conducted research on the regulation of investment advisors. Her most recent project, which studies regulation of hedge funds, uses econometric techniques to disentangle the effects of disclosure and enforcement on misstatements of hedge fund results.
- Corporate Governance
- Law & Finance
- Securities Regulation
Education & Professional Certifications
- Columbia Business School, Ph.D., 2016 (expected)
- New York Bar Admission. 2012.
- Columbia Law School, J.D., 2011
- Certified Public Accountant. California, 2006
- University of California, Los Angeles, B.S., 2005
Recent Published Papers
- “State Contract Law and Debt Contracts,” 57 J.L. & ECON. 1031 (2014) (with Sharon Katz and Gil Sadka)(showing that the consequences of covenant violations for debtors, measured as changes in the debtor’s investment policy, are greater when state contract law is more favorable to lenders).
- “The Hidden Nature of Executive Retirement Pay,” 100 VA. L. REV. 479 (2014)(with Robert J. Jackson)(finding that the contractual structure of executive retirement pay is not, as has been previously suggested, truly “debt-like,” thus questioning whether such pay provides executives with incentives to reduce firm risk).
- "Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations," S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (with James Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, and Randall S. Thomas)(examining the use of “bundling” in management proxy proposals).
- “Individual Investors and Mandatory Disclosure: Evidence from the JOBS Act,” WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming)(with Robert J. Jackson and Yu-ting Forester Wong)(providing evidence that reductions in mandatory disclosure requirements lead to reduced participation by individual investors).
Recent Working Papers
- “Disclosure Versus Enforcement and the Optimal Design of Securities Regulation,” (showing that hedge fund regulation reduces agency costs, and that mandatory disclosure requirements—rather than increased enforcement intensity—drive the effectiveness of the regulation).
Colleen can be reached at CHonigsberg16@gsb.columbia.edu.