Program Research Scholar
Kevin S. Haeberle
Post-Doctoral Research Scholar
Program in the Law & Economics of Capital Markets
Columbia Law School & Columbia Business School
Officer of Research
Columbia Law School
In addition to pursuing his scholarly aims relating to securities law, Kevin's focus is on helping the Program develop the first-of-its-kind Capital Markets Regulation course.
- Incorporate social-welfare analysis of an under-examined area of securities regulation (stock trading) into the field's scholarly canon that predominantly focuses on the three main areas of securities regulation (disclosure, fraud, & insider trading)
- Use principles from microstructure economics to aid analysis of trading rules in the same way that admired works use economics more broadly to examine disclsoure, fraud, and insider-trading rules
Works In Progress
Securities Regulation and the Law of Stock-Market Structure. Scholars have long argued that a principal purpose—if not the principal purpose—of securities law is to ensure the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices. When these companies’ stock prices are accurate, they reason, society better governs corporations and allocates capital, thereby leading to higher levels of social welfare. This key economic insight—that is, that increased stock-price accuracy leads to more social wealth—animates much of the modern scholarly understanding of the disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading rules that make up the conventional core of securities law. Yet, despite assembling a canon of literature on the implications of these three main areas of securities law for stock-price accuracy and welfare, securities law scholars have largely failed to examine the implications of the law of stock-market structure for the accuracy of stock prices and social welfare.
The Law of Stock-Market Structure focuses on this under-examined area of securities law. Specifically, the Article examines the foundational stock-trading rules that allow one of the stock market’s two broad types of trading venues (newer off-exchange venues) to target certain investors and exclude others, while mandating that the other broad type of venue (traditional exchanges) must remain open to all investors. It asserts that these rules permit an unprecedented and growing segmentation in which off-exchange venues are dominated by uninformed investors, and exchanges are hosting larger portions of informed investors than they otherwise might. It asserts that this legally sanctioned segmentation insidiously reduces stock-price accuracy, resulting in social costs relating to inferior corporate governance and capital allocation. Accordingly, the Article offers policy proposals that would eliminate this harm to stock-price accuracy, and sets forth the economic considerations necessary for policymakers to determine whether adopting them would be socially desirable.
Shortchanging Retail Investors: Why Best-Execution Laws Fail to Achieve the Best
Teaching Experience (Columbia Law School)
- Visiting Lecturer -- Securities Regulation with Professor Fox (Spring 2014).
- Visiting Lecturer -- Capital Markets Regulation with Professors Fox and Glosten (Fall 2013)
- Teaching Fellow -- Introduction to U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions with Professor Robert Jackson, Jr. (August 2012)
- Teaching Assistant -- Capital Markets Regulation (Spring 2011)
- Capital Markets Regulation, Securities Regulation, Corporations, Corporate Finance
- Litigation Associate -- Friedman, Kaplan, Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York, N.Y. (May 2007 - Aug. 2009)
- Litigation Associate -- Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, N.Y. (May 2006 - May 2007)
- Law Clerk -- Judge Victor Marrero, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sept. 2009 - Nov. 2010)
- Foreign Law Clerk -- Chief Justice Aharon Barak, Supreme Court of Israel (Aug. 2005 - Apr. 2006)
- J.D., Columbia Law School (2005)
- B.A. (English), Georgetown University, College of Arts & Sciences (1999)
- Email: email@example.com
- Phone: (212) 854-0288
- Address: Columbia Law School, Jerome Greene Hall, Office 848, 435 West 116th Street, New York, N.Y. 10027